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## THESIS

**HOUSE DIVIDED:  
THE SPLITTING OF ACTIVE DUTY CIVIL AFFAIRS  
FORCES**

by

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December 2009

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This thesis examines the U.S. Army's current plan to create an Active Duty Civil Affairs Brigade within U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to provide direct support to general purpose forces (GPF). This thesis analyzes this new alignment of Civil Affairs forces within the U.S. Army, to determine if this is the best course of action considering the current and emerging operational environment, and possible effects on the Active Duty Civil Affairs branch. Recommendations are given to rectify the problems identified, and to suggest alternate courses of action regarding the placement of Civil Affairs forces and their structure within the U.S. Army. With DoD directive 3000.7 stating that Irregular Warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and Field Manual 3-0 stating stability operations are equivalent to both offensive and defensive operations, Civil Affairs will have a key role in almost all conflicts in the foreseeable future. DoD Directive 3000.7 makes clear that any new Civil Affairs force structure formed now, will affect the U.S. Army's ability to confront threats in the coming years.

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**HOUSE DIVIDED:  
THE SPLITTING OF ACTIVE DUTY CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES**

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This thesis examines the U.S. Army's current plan to create an Active Duty Civil Affairs Brigade within U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to provide direct support to general purpose forces (GPF). This thesis analyzes this new alignment of Civil Affairs forces within the U.S. Army, to determine if this is the best course of action considering the current and emerging operational environment, and possible effects on the Active Duty Civil Affairs branch. Recommendations are given to rectify the problems identified, and to suggest alternate courses of action regarding the placement of Civil Affairs forces and their structure within the U.S. Army. With DoD directive 3000.7 stating that Irregular Warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and Field Manual 3-0 stating stability operations are equivalent to both offensive and defensive operations, Civil Affairs will have a key role in almost all conflicts in the foreseeable future. DoD Directive 3000.7 makes clear that any new Civil Affairs force structure formed now, will affect the U.S. Army's ability to confront threats in the coming years.

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# I INTRODUCTION

## A. BACKGROUND

I was to learn later in life that,  
perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation  
to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method  
it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing  
confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.  
— Charlton Ogburn, "Merrill's Marauders,"  
*Harpers Magazine*, January 1957.

Since 2001, the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, and then Iraq, have been the catalyst for many changes in the U.S. Army. Some of the more dramatic changes are in the structure, employment and overall perception of the Civil Affairs branch. Once considered a minor functional area by the Army, the Civil Affairs career field has now moved to the forefront of operations around the globe. The inattention to Civil Affairs operations by conventional commanders in the post-Vietnam era was one of the reasons cited for assigning the Civil Affairs branch into the special operations community in 1987 (Marquis, 1997 p. 156). However, since DoD directive 3000.7 states that Irregular Warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and Field Manual 3-0 now states stability operations are equal to both offensive and defensive operations, Civil Affairs will have a key role in almost any conflict in the foreseeable future. This thesis will examine the increasing importance of Civil Affairs in the context of an important new change under consideration. This change would involve adding an additional Active Duty Civil Affairs brigade under operational control of U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) for the support of the conventional or general-purpose forces.

This thesis will argue that this operational placement under FORSCOM will not adequately meet short-term needs, and ultimately that more harm than good will come to the Civil Affairs branch from this action. The harmful results will reflect themselves in the form of negative second- and third-order effects, ultimately constraining the Army and the Civil Affairs branch. The conclusion is that these negative effects will have

lasting consequences on the Civil Affairs career field and the Army's ability to conduct future operations. The reality of DoD Directive 3000.7 and the coequal status of stability operations make clear that any structure formed now for Civil Affairs must address long-term requirements and must encompass more than just an attempt to meet a short-term need.

## **B. MISSION**

The mission of Civil Affairs, as outlined in FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations (2006) is to provide:

...the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander uses the capabilities of Civil Affairs to analyze and influence the human terrain through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. As part of the commander's civil-military operations, Civil Affairs conducts operations in conjunction with the overall mission and intent. The use of Civil Affairs significantly helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the mission, by advising how to meet the moral and legal obligations to the people affected by military operations. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organization in the operational environment to achieve a desired effect (p. 1-1).

During conflicts, the population is always the “decisive point” for Civil Affairs personnel.<sup>1</sup> This trait makes them an important component in any conflict, but essential in counterinsurgency, insurgency, and irregular warfare. In this zero-sum atmosphere, in order to grow, an insurgent must take from the counterinsurgents’ support base. In order to do so, the insurgent needs the population. If the insurgent can control the population and get its active support, the insurgent will win. The same holds true for the counterinsurgent at the opposite end of the spectrum (Galula, 1967, p. 4). In short, one must lose something in order for the other to gain. Having additional resources may assist but will not change the rules of the game. Active Civil Affairs assets can provide

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines decisive point as a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 1-02, 2009, p. 148.)

either the insurgent or counterinsurgent with ways and means for influencing the target population through access and contact by use of projects. These projects can come in the form of, but are not limited to, wells, schools, and humanitarian aid. Reserve Civil Affairs personnel have a much larger range of skills, thereby increasing the number of ways they can access the population in the long term.

### **C. HISTORY**

Civil Affairs is a unique branch, not only divided by its Active and Reserve organizations, but by functional specialists and generalists. For the majority of branches within the Army, the Reserve function of the branch is a mirror image of its Active counterpart in both structure and mission. For example, a Reserve Infantry unit has the same overall mission as an Active Infantry unit and structured in a near-identical fashion. This is not the case for Active and Reserve Civil Affairs units, which have separate missions and structures, and make delineations between generalist and functional skill sets.

CA generalists support the commander's immediate needs by planning and coordinating Civil Affairs Operations that support the Civil Military Operation goals and objectives as outlined in the supporting Civil Military Operations strategy. The ability to negotiate with local civilians and a thorough knowledge of the military decision-making process are critical skills of the CA generalist (FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations, p. 1-8).

The generalist forces are designed to meet the immediate needs of the population. With their regional and language skills, they have the ability to quickly imbed within a society, build rapport and begin the mapping of the human terrain. However, generalists do not have the skill sets for reconstruction or nation building. These skill sets reside within the Reserve Civil Affairs force.

The Reserve Civil Affairs organization has functional specialists trained in areas such as rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. These individuals with technical

skill are qualified and experienced practitioners who can advise and assist commanders, as well as their civilian counterparts within their area of expertise (FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations, p. 1-9). The Active Civil Affairs forces do not have the skills of the functional specialist because these skills cannot be maintained at adequate levels without incurring great cost. However, for the Reserves, their personnel do these jobs in their civilian roles each day. The functional specialties are considered the “crown jewels” of Civil Affairs (Civil Affairs Association, 2007, p. 2-1).

Since the early 1970s, the majority of the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs capabilities have been within the Reserve Component. This was a result of a decision made by General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff, to move most of the Army’s combat service and combat service support into the Reserves as a cost saving measure. Since Reserve Civil Affairs units were not considered part of the initial force package of any conflict, it was felt there would be no loss to the Army’s effectiveness (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 33).

This separation of Civil Affairs into Reserve and Active elements led to the reorganization of the Active Army’s only Civil Affairs asset, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. This Active Duty Battalion consisted of culturally and linguistically trained companies regionally aligned to specific Combatant Commands. However, during the Cold War Era, very little emphasis was placed on Civil Affairs operations, and assignment into this career field was largely seen as a dead-end assignment (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 30). However, Civil Affairs did have a decades-long connection to Special Operations, dating to the early 1960s when Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces were “special” assets under the Special Warfare Directorate (Krepinevich, 1988, p. 43). During the 1980s, the Civil Affairs career field began to gain some recognition and support from within the Special Operations community. The connection with Special Operations and the recognition received from this community would assist in the eventual decision as to where Civil Affairs forces would reside operationally.

From the spring through the summer of 1987, the issue of where Civil Affairs forces would reside operationally went unresolved. Admiral William Crowe, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that, “While the missions of PSYOP and CA forces are broader than special operations, these forces should benefit from the resource advocacy that General Lindsay will provide as the unified commander” (Marquis, 1997, p. 156). Additionally it was determined the close relationships fostered with other special operations forces in areas of orientation and language training would create mutual benefits (Marquis, 1997, pp. 156–157). The counter-argument stated that Civil Affairs operations supported both conventional and unconventional warfare, and that assignment to special operations would leave the conventional forces without adequate support (Marquis, 1997 p. 156). After much debate, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made his decision in the fall of 1987 to assign all Civil Affairs assets to 1st SOCOM, which eventually became the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). Today, the Army is again revisiting those same issues.

On 12 January 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, concerned about the rising violence in Iraq, issued a short memo to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Meyers. In this memo, the Secretary asked if Civil Affairs should be removed from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and placed in direct support of General Purpose Forces (GPF). The Secretary felt the Regular Army needed to do a better job at stabilization, while other elements within Special Operations Command should focus more on direct action (Ricks, 2005).

The Army attempted to meet the spirit of the Secretary of Defense’s request by moving Reserve Civil Affairs forces to the U.S. Army Reserve Command for eventual alignment with maneuver brigades, while maintaining the Active Civil Affairs forces under USASOC (Ricks, 2005). By doing this, the GPF received the bulk of Civil Affairs assets, approximately 96%, for their support, and USASOC retained the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, which had a habitual relationship with the Special Forces Groups since 1987. Additionally, under this agreement, the 96th, the only Active Duty Civil Affairs battalion, would expand to a brigade to meet the special operations community’s growing need for

Civil Affairs skills. The implementation of this decision occurred in 2006, in what is commonly referred to in the Civil Affairs community as “the divorce.” Unfortunately, this decision proved less than satisfactory.

In 2008, with the increasing demands on the U.S. armed forces due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked for another review of Civil Affairs. This review looked specifically at options for increasing Civil Affairs in the Active Component to support conventional forces. From the review, it was decided that the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would grow by one battalion, the Reserve Civil Affairs would receive an additional twenty Reserve Civil Affairs companies, and a new Active Component Civil Affairs brigade would be built to support conventional forces (Cotton, 2008).

#### **D. THESIS OUTLINE**

This thesis will illustrate how the decision to create a Civil Affairs brigade in support of General Purpose Forces could be counterproductive to the Army’s overall success, and why the creation of this unit would still not allow for adequate Civil Affairs support for conventional units in the long term. It will also prove that any creation of an Active Civil Affairs unit should support Special Operations, while the continued support of the Reserves to General Purpose Forces would enable each to perform better in future conflicts.

Chapter II of this thesis will discuss the current structure and training of Active Duty Civil Affairs. This will allow the reader to become familiar with the Active branch as a whole and show the different skill sets that reside within the Active and Reserve Civil Affairs units. The chapter will also detail both the current and future environments U.S. forces are and may find themselves operating. Through this examination, a determination is made as to the most likely and least likely operational scenarios to present themselves in the next 10–15 years.

Chapter III will analyze the Army’s proposal for creating a new Civil Affairs brigade within U.S. Army Forces Command. By creating this “Dual Headquarters” for

Active Civil Affairs, a competition for resources arises within the branch. From now until 2013, as this new Civil Affairs brigade and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade attempt to grow, each will need many of the same requirements in terms of personnel and equipment at exactly the same time in order to achieve full operational strength. This puts each Active Civil Affairs unit in direct competition with the other.

Chapter III will further show that this “Dual Headquarters” option will not meet the immediate needs of Iraq and Afghanistan and will not meet the needs of the likely operating environment as outlined in Chapter II. This option will continue to degrade the skills within the Civil Affairs branch, will not provide habitual support to conventional units, and will place the Army at risk in terms of its ability to deal with the future threat environment.

Chapter IV will examine an alternative to the Army’s plan by examining the possibility of a new Civil Affairs brigade residing alongside the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade under the operational control of U.S. Army Special Operations Command. This “Single Headquarters” alternative will not create a competition for resources between the two Civil Affairs Brigades. Instead, using techniques already in practice by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, this alternative provides mission gain, as opposed to possible mission shortfall. This chapter will show that this alternative best aligns the forces needed within the likely operating environment. Due to uncertainty of future events, the less likely environment is also examined. In each case, this alternative is able to provide better Civil Affairs support with the requisite skills needed for any area of operations. However, this alternative, like the Army’s plan, is unable to provide habitual support to conventional units.

Chapter V will highlight deficiencies or shortcomings not addressed by either option. The first deficiency is the inability of the Active Civil Affairs to grow a more robust strategic presence. The second deficiency is the lack of habitual support to conventional forces provided by either option. For both deficiencies, courses of action are given to address these problems. Each course of action, however, is most easily achieved under the “Single Headquarters” option.

Chapter VI will provide conclusions and recommendations for what is best for not only the Civil Affairs branch, but also the Army.

Appendix A will provide a more detailed analysis of the Reserve Civil Affairs component. Any complete solution for Civil Affairs must incorporate the Reserves, due to the differing, yet complementary skills residing within each component. This makes it impossible to formulate any solution for one without including the other. Due to this, within this thesis, as on the battlefield, each component is used to assist its counterpart; therefore, the reader will find references to the Reserve Civil Affairs, but, due to scope, will not be fully addressed. Appendix A addresses additional Reserve-specific issues in a more complete manner and provides possible courses of action that may assist in the future study of this critical component of Civil Affairs.

Appendix B will examine the case studies of Colombia and the Philippines in order to provide examples of Civil Affairs operations in an emerging environment. Each highlights the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a preventive, small-footprint fashion to show the possible gains and utility of this method. For the purposes of this thesis only, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Special Forces are included under the term of SOF.

#### **E. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE**

The purpose of this thesis is based on the belief that the focus placed on current operations, although essential in the near term, is decrementing the Army's combat Civil Affairs capabilities in the long term. While both SOF and GPF are equal participants in the current conflicts, SOF will ultimately bear the heaviest burdens in the Army's coming engagements around the world. SOF, however, lacks the manpower to meet the requirements of the emerging threat environment, especially within the non-lethal arena. While GPF will play a role, it will be more limited and will not likely include areas outside of what is presently seen.

This emerging global environment will look much like the environment witnessed over the past twenty years. It will look like Colombia, El Salvador, and the operations

currently taking place in Africa and the Philippines. Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, it will be SOF-heavy with little or no GPF involvement. No country wants to appear occupied or dominated by the United States; therefore, outside of an U.S.-led invasion, a future involving a Brigade Combat Team led configuration, complete with requisite support functions, will not materialize. Instead, it will be small footprint, assistance/interdiction provided without the appearance of occupation or of being overly influenced by the United States.

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## **II. CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENT**

Currently, the Active Civil Affairs component is comprised of one brigade, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, located at Fort Bragg, NC, under the operational control of United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). As the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade took form, it mirrored the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, only on a larger scale. Each Battalion stood up from the company element that constituted the original 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, thus ensuring regional focus and skills were not lost in the process of expansion. These companies, now battalions, have a long history of habitual relationships with the Special Forces Groups with whom they share common areas of operation, language capability, regional experience and, often, personnel. For example, the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion, originally Alpha Company in the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, has worked extensively with 7th Special Forces Group throughout Central and South America, while the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion, originally Bravo Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion maintains constant rotations into the Philippines with the 1st Special Forces Group. Historically the majority of Active Duty Civil Affairs missions have been in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) (Hartzel, 2009). To maintain these relationships Active Duty Civil Affairs personnel receive assignments directly to Special Forces Groups to assist in coordination and utilization of the assets. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is still not at full operational strength, as not all battalion elements have formally stood up. This process will take another two years with an expected completion in Fiscal Year 2012 (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). Growth within Civil Affairs will be continual until approximately 2013, causing an increased need for qualified personnel.

Civil Affairs officers are selected from the Army's basic branches annually through a board process. Within an officer's career timeline, this process occurs between the third and fourth year of commissioned service. The board is comprised of former or sitting battalion commanders from Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological Operations. Each individual candidate's records are reviewed and all are scored on performance, potential, skills and experience. Through this screening, an order of merit

list is created and officers are then selected to attend Civil Affairs training. The process of taking an officer from his or her basic branch and sending them through Civil Affairs training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) to become a Civil Affairs officer is commonly referred to as the pipeline or training pipeline. Once the training pipeline is complete, the officer then becomes part of the Civil Affairs branch. A very similar process holds true for Non-Commissioned officers as well.

The current training model for Active Duty Civil Affairs is the 44-week course at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), Fort Bragg consisting of five phases. The course's design formalized the training pipeline to meet new branch requirements vice the old functional area needs seen prior to the branch standing up in October 2006. Prior to this, the pipeline was more ad hoc consisting of three separate portions: Civil Affairs Qualification Course, Regional Studies and language training. If an individual had prior training in any of these three areas, that individual was not required to go through that portion of the training. Now the pipeline must be completed in its entirety for an individual to be considered fully trained.

The requirements for the new training pipeline arose from the needs inherent with standing up an entirely new career field within the Active Forces. Since Civil Affairs was a functional area only for officers, there had been no formalized training for NCOs in conjunction with officer training. Previously this had not been an issue as there was no Active Career field within Civil Affairs for NCOs and all NCOs serving within Civil Affairs were Special Forces qualified who had already been through language training, regional training and had operational experience within their assigned areas of operation. With the stand up of the Civil Affairs branch and increased demand for Special Forces, this would no longer be the case and NCOs would require training equal to the Civil Affairs officers.

This pipeline, described below, was designed to make the transition from a Functional Area to a Branch. Officers and NCOs trained together, only separating during Phase 2 briefly to receive individual skills necessary for their different roles. Under this pipeline, each receives language training, regional training, and the skill sets necessary to

succeed as either a Civil Affairs Team Leader or NCO at the tactical level. The stated goal of this training is to produce an adaptive leader or operator, culturally aware, and regionally oriented with foreign language capability (Mundell, 2007).




Figure 1. Training pipeline incorporated in 2008 (Mundell, 2007)

This lengthy process, from selection to completion of all training, has implications in terms of manning. Unlike the Army's basic branches, Civil Affairs does not produce a large number of personnel each year, nor can they be trained in a relatively short time as will be seen in the following chapter. This means that any sizable increase in Civil Affairs personnel must consider these factors, if it is to be successful. While the issue of manning a new unit is important, understanding the environment or future environment needs consideration as well. Each environment places different demands on Civil Affairs and on active and reserve Civil Affairs components. Any operational placement of Civil Affairs units needs to incorporate the career field's ability to provide support in either small-scale or major force deployments within conventional or irregular situations.

In the current environment, the United States is involved in two protracted conflicts fighting irregular non-state actors. The future or emerging threat environment, however, is not so well defined. All agree the future will bring more conflict but no one can determine with any amount of certainty what kind of conflict will present itself.

According to the *Joint Operating Environment 2008*, “Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force” there are two major scenarios facing the United States: 1) a major war with another state or alliance of states, and 2) the failure to understand and engage the irregular fight currently taking place (United States Joint Forces Command, 2008). This however, bases all irregular fights on the Iraq/Afghanistan template and does not account for smaller scale, preventative actions like the Philippines and Colombia.

These actions within countries like the Philippines and Colombia also fall under irregular warfare (IW), but on a much smaller scale. Based on this irregular fights have two classifications models, small-scale (Philippines and Colombia) and large-scale (Iraq and Afghanistan). The fact that large scale can mean both state on state and state on non-state (irregular) is taken for a given. Large-scale state on state and large-scale irregular fights will be treated as the same within this thesis as either would require large troop movements in order to accomplish mission goals. Further, small scale implies assistance to a friendly or allied state in instances outside of invasion/occupation by American forces. This is due to concerns of legitimacy and sovereignty within the affected country. So, which is the most likely in the emerging environment, the large-scale as currently seen in Iraq or Afghanistan, a major state-on-state action, or the small-scale as seen in the Philippines and Colombia?

Currently, the U.S. has no peer opponent, although China’s sphere of influence is rising. However, some feel China’s greatest threat is in the possibility of its implosion (David, 2008, p. 116). Having no peer opponent does not negate the possibility of a state on state conflict, of course. North Korea or Iran could potentially force future U.S. action. However, what makes state on state conflict and the large-scale irregular fight less likely are the current large-scale irregular conflicts taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Both Iraq and Afghanistan began as state on state actions, initiated by the United States that later devolved into engagements with non-state actors. The first factor limiting the number of future large-scale engagements is cost: to date, according to the National Priorities Project, the cost of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is \$922,000,000,000 and rising daily. The human toll should not appear as a just number,

due to the rippling effect it has on the services and local communities, and it unfortunately rises each day too. The second factor is political will. After nine long years at war, polls are beginning to show the will of the American people is starting to falter. Accordingly, it is highly likely that another large-scale deployment of troops will bring fierce resistance unless the United States is directly threatened. Lastly, the U.S. military forces must reset. With military resources and personnel worn down by the current operational tempo, another large-scale event on the heels of the current conflicts could cause damage to the U.S. military in terms of equipment and personnel readiness. Recently, the Army has begun targeting Captains for incentive bonuses to stem the increasing numbers of officers leaving the military due to repeated deployments (Bowman, 2007). These same factors would hold true for any large-scale irregular threat similar to Iraq or Afghanistan.

The average period between major conflicts for the United States is approximately 10–15 years, and that provides a planning norm to allow for the factors listed above to regenerate and renew themselves. Consequently, small-scale preventative actions would appear the most likely events over the next 10–15 years and will be used as such for the remainder of this study. Recognizing the possibility of two distinct environments in future operations, the Army in January 2009 sought to produce guidance for preparing force packages to deal with both possible events.

The Army produced a plan to deal with this future environment in the January 2009 Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. This report gives insight as to how the Army will carry out future deployment actions. It stated:

The SOF and GPF force mix for conducting future operations will largely depend on the risk and character of the operational environment, not simply by the task at hand. For example, when operational environments dictate that the joint force presence remains unobtrusive, SOF will play a leading role. General Purpose Forces will continue to play a leading role in operational environments where a large-scale presence is warranted to provide security to a population (p. 12).

By the explanation of the plan, it would appear that any deployment that would seem obtrusive is large-scale. This may vary from country to country and places limitations on the forces inserted. Since these are sovereign nations, outside of invasion the affected country's wishes must be taken into consideration. As shown in Appendix B, the Philippines considered anything above two hundred obtrusive. Due to possible host country constraints on the size of force packages, deploying elements will need a wide range of skills in order to be effective.

The delineation between a SOF environment and a GPF environment within the Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report affects predictions of operational tempo. By indicating this split, the Army is in fact determining under what circumstances either force, SOF or GPF can expect the most utility and therefore be the most effective. Accordingly, due to the likely threat environment, as defined in this thesis, the conventional forces can expect a decrease in their operational tempo. However, simply because the indicators and rationale point to one particular direction in regards to the emerging or future environment does not make it so. History is full of surprises and due to that, the structure created for the Civil Affairs force needs the flexibility to succeed in the most likely environment (small-scale) and the anomalous instances (large-scale) that may arise.

### III. CURRENT ARMY PLAN (“DUAL HEADQUARTERS”)

History records few instances where a majority of the population welcomes an occupying army. — Ivan Muscicant, *Banana Wars*, p. 109

The U.S. Army is currently seeking to array its forces to best deal with the present conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as potential conflicts to come. In order to accomplish this task the Army intends to split the Active Civil Affairs headquarters element. As previously stated, all Active Civil Affairs is under U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The change would require creation of a new Civil Affairs brigade under the operational control of U.S. Army Forces Command. Therefore, instead of all Active Civil Affairs under one Major Area Command, the Active Civil Affairs forces would find themselves split between two separate commands.

By having this new Civil Affairs brigade under U.S. Forces Command, the Army will attempt to address the need for additional Civil Affairs forces to support Iraq and Afghanistan. In a recent report to Congress on Civil Affairs dated April 29, 2009, the document states, “This increase will meet current demand for Civil Affairs personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan within the Secretary of Defense’s prescribed dwell ratios by 2013.” However, most agree the vast majority of U.S. forces will be out of Iraq by 2012. There is currently a move within the Iraqi government for a vote to withdraw American forces by the end of 2011. For Afghanistan, public opinion after eight years of conflict with little or no gains is now beginning to show signs of strain. Without a dramatic change in direction, this trend will continue and the United States will seek to scale back its involvement. In November 2009, the military was awaiting a decision regarding an increase in force levels in Afghanistan in order to regain the initiative against the Taliban. Should this increase in U. S. forces take place in the short-term, there will still be a reduction of U.S. forces there in the mid- to long-term, as there has been in Iraq. This anticipated reduction of conventional forces is in contrast to the operations of SOF personnel who are expected to continue to conduct their mission at their current level of

unit commitment in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Cleveland, 2009). In direct relation to this decrease of conventional forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is the stand up time of the new brigade. By 2011, only six new Civil Affairs Companies will be ready, providing there are no personnel or equipment issues (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). In 2012, eighteen companies will be active, but due to the reasons stated above, it is debatable the impact these elements will have within Iraq or Afghanistan.

In addition to preparing forces for deployments that might not take place; the new alignment will also cause problems in the training pipeline. By placing the new Civil Affairs brigade in support of GPF, the training pipeline must also conform to meet this new requirement. This change may lead to possible training modifications, and give those responsible for training Civil Affairs personnel three viable options; 1) two entirely different training tracks, 2) the same training for both GPF and SOF Civil Affairs, or 3) a modified track encompassing parts of the current training pipeline, but not all.

Option 1 creates two entirely different training tracks, one training pipeline for Civil Affairs personnel in support of GPF and one training pipeline for Civil Affairs personnel in support of SOF. This course of action would be extremely problematic. In order to accomplish this task the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) would have to double the number of Civil Affairs trainers, and build additional physical structures to accommodate the new training program. SWCS is already straining to meet current demand, and it is doubtful the branch could fill the new requirements for cadre. Additionally this would cause a need for the creation of new curriculum in order to prepare the GPF Civil Affairs for their role and creation of a process to determine those Civil Affairs personnel who would support GPF and those that would support SOF.

Option 2 sets the same training for both GPF and SOF Civil Affairs. This would be much easier to accommodate by both the branch and SWCS, as it only requiring an increase in cadre and physical structures for training, but it too brings problems. Under this model, nothing would change in the pipeline and all would graduate with the same skills sets, but not all would have the opportunity to utilize them. Those selected for assignment to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) would see their language and cultural skills

wasted unless their assigned unit actually deployed to their region of expertise. The branch could attempt to circumvent this by having personnel float back and forth between GPF and SOF but the results would be the same, an atrophy of skills.

This problem of regional and language skills loss is already significant as Civil Affairs personnel continue to deploy to regions outside of their areas due to the shortage of trained personnel. This option would accelerate the process and exacerbate the problem. For example, when the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion stood up there were very few present for the ceremony; most of the 97th was deployed to Afghanistan. The 97th is the Pacific Command oriented battalion. Shortly after the 97th Civil Affairs Teams returned from Afghanistan, they redeployed to Iraq. Members of the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion have already deployed to Iraq and the Philippines and are supporting operations in Africa. The 98th is the Southern Command oriented battalion.

Option 3 a modified track encompassing parts of the current training pipeline but not all, and is a course of action the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School and Civil Affairs Branch could also more easily perform but this would also create problems in the long term. Under this option, the regional and language aspects of the training would face elimination for the GPF Civil Affairs soldiers. However, part of what makes the branch unique is its cultural knowledge and language skills; under this model, these skills would be lost for the GPF Civil Affairs officers and NCOs. Cultural skills and language would not serve a BCT well, due to the lack of regional alignment within the conventional forces. It would simply be unreasonable to expect the Civil Affairs personnel in a BCT to be experts in all societies. The fact is Civil Affairs personnel are supposed to be cultural experts of their region and masters of the human terrain, but in this scenario they would simply be a “jack of all trades and a master of none.” This option would also call for some type of delineation process to occur separating future SOF and GPF Civil Affairs prior to training.

At the tactical level relationships with the host nation and its population can be destroyed and legitimacy ruined by a lack of knowledge of the culture. Not to give Civil Affairs teams this knowledge or to continue to send them to areas outside of their training increases the likelihood of problems and decreases their overall utility in a given

situation. It is essential to structure Civil Affairs assets properly for the missions they are best suited for and trained to accomplish. Training, however, is not the only concern for this new brigade, manning and resourcing within two separate commands will also bring issues. For the purposes of this thesis, it will be assumed that SWCS will choose the second option in an attempt to retain necessary branch skills while causing the least amount of disruption to the Civil Affairs training pipeline.




Figure 2. Proposed Growth SOF and GPF (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009)

Splitting the headquarters elements of this new Civil Affairs brigade outside of USASOC produces two entities from different commands competing for identical resources in a time of war, with limited manpower and equipment pools. While the Army is growing overall, not all personnel in the Army are eligible for Civil Affairs assignments. These personnel must meet specific criteria in terms of intelligence, aptitude, physical ability, and performance before they are selected to attend Civil Affairs training. This much smaller pool must then be shared between two commands.

According to a brief produced by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, approved growth for the unit in FY 2010 calls for an additional four Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 128 personnel, during that same time the GPF Brigade requires a brigade headquarters (106 personnel), one battalion headquarters (73 personnel) and six Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 192 personnel. In FY 2011, this competition becomes more

pronounced as the growth for 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is approved for one battalion headquarters (73 personnel) and five Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 160 personnel. In that same year, the GPF Brigade is approved to grow two battalion headquarters (146 personnel) and 12 Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 384 personnel. The numbers represented here are for all Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), both officer and enlisted are represented within the growth of both units. These numbers include both Civil Affairs personnel and lower density skills such as intelligence and signal. As seen, there is competition for resources in FY10 for company assets. This competition expands in FY11 including not only company level, but battalion level assets as well.

In respect to Civil Affairs personnel, the GPF brigade will require at the company level 168 personnel in FY10 (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). In FY11 and FY12, the GPF brigade will require 336 for each year at the company level (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). At the same time, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade will require 112 Civil Affairs personnel at the company level for FY10 and 140 for FY11 (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). These are formidable numbers to obtain, especially when one considers it takes 6 to 10 ½ months to train a Civil Affairs NCO, depending on language training. An officer can take up to 19 months to train due to the Captain's Career Course and Airborne training which must be completed prior to entering the Civil Affairs training pipeline. The time it takes to produce qualified personnel is directly tied to the ability to staff these two units within the prescribed timeframes, especially under different command structures. This means that many would have to be in the training pipeline now in order to meet the proposed effective date, which is 16 Oct 2010 (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). This becomes more problematic when one considers the number of personnel in the training pipeline can fluctuate depending on availability of personnel to attend training. Current Human Resources Command guidelines are such that a deployed individual cannot be removed from his or her position for training unless the affected command approves of the loss. This is to prevent an adverse affect on a unit's mission capabilities while engaged in combat operations. For training projections, however, it means no two classes are ever the same in number of personnel. Some are

filled to capacity; others have barely enough to be considered a class. This has been a recurring constraint within training pipeline projections and will continue until the operational tempo subsides. Training and manning a unit is the precursor for operational usage and operational capacity. Operational capacity, which is the new Civil Affairs unit's ability to function within its environment, must also be addressed along with personnel and training issues.

Before looking at the least likely scenario, a model of usage must first be constructed, as none presently exists outside of Iraq or Afghanistan. The Horn of Africa could be cited, but the scale is not sufficient to warrant the restructuring of an entire branch to support operations in the Horn so the model must incorporate something larger. General George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, has stated he sees approximately ten brigades deployed annually in the coming years ("Army Chief," 2009). These ten brigades deployed, depicted below will be referred to as the "10-Forward" Model and will act as the basis for comparison.




Figure 3. GPF "10-Forward" Model with current MTOE

The unit patches represent conceptual selections of BCTs as an example. As per p. 1-6 of FM 3-05.40 *Civil Affairs Operations*, one Civil Affairs company can support one BCT; these supporting companies are represented directly below the unit. The Civil

Affairs companies and their battalion headquarters elements not deploying in this scenario are represented in the lower right. If all BCTs are deploying to one area regional alignment for the new Civil Affairs brigade is disrupted. If five BCTs are going to one area of operation and five to another as defined by the Combatant Commands, regional alignment can be maintained for one rotation (current conventional rotations are from 12–15 months), but subsequent rotations will not have this aligned support. With only five companies per area of operations, there simply will not be any regionally aligned elements left within the new brigade to provide support. This will force the new brigade to begin sending in forces that usually operate in other areas of operation. The longer these rotations occur, the more damage inflicted upon the new brigade's regional and language skills. Subsequent representations of this model are based on the same principles described here. As will be discussed later the probability of the BCTs deploying to separate areas individually is low. To deploy alone would imply an attempt to make the operation unobtrusive, which by Army guidance necessitates SOF.

By looking at the GPF “10-Forward” model, it is clear that with as little as five BCTs deployed, regional orientation within the Civil Affairs brigade is lost if the action takes more than one rotation in the area of operation to resolve. As seen below, even factoring in the proposed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) request for additional personnel and structure for the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would not allow for the maintenance of regional alignment, nor would it allow for habitual support by the new Civil Affairs brigade. This QDR request asks for an additional company per battalion and an additional Civil Affairs Team per company (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009). As discussed, this problem of regional alignment is already present within the career field and under the “Dual Headquarters” will get worse. Under the “Dual Headquarters” alignment, the new Civil Affairs forces can expect use in a manner that most certainly will eliminate their regional and cultural skills. This degradation of skills will cause a loss of effectiveness in the long term for Civil Affairs forces.




Figure 4. GPF “10-Forward” Model with QDR MTOE Request

Even at full operational strength, this new Civil Affairs brigade can only support 30 out of 71 total BCTs. This makes habitual support to the conventional units impossible under any circumstances. Further, there is not enough depth to allow the Active Civil Affairs personnel to maintain the skills necessary within the career field. This is due the new Civil Affairs brigade's lack of ability to maintain regional alignment leading to further loss of regional and language skills. Other constraints make the proposed Army plan fail for the likely environment scenario as well.

This study assumes that most readers are extremely familiar with the large-scale environment given the nightly news coverage, but the small-scale environment is decidedly different. These small actions occur much more frequently than their counterpart, but go largely unnoticed by the American public and so therefore require a more in-depth description. They often involve counterinsurgency, but due to sovereignty and legitimacy issues, necessitate a less robust force package.

Legitimacy is primarily a social practice dealing with the relationship of the ruled vice the rulers.<sup>2</sup> Legitimacy is “multifaceted, highly contingent, and a dynamic feature of government; hence its cultivation must be unending” (Alagappa, 1995, p. 1). Within the aspects of the “right to rule” are four key elements.

The first of these key elements for political legitimacy is shared norms and values. These speak to the belief system or ideologies inherent within a society (Alagappa, 1995, p. 15). Shared norms and values lead to social bonds, which in turn lead to an agreement on which the rulers must adhere to in order to remain in power. In a diverse society the more the dominant group appears to represent the overall interests of the people the more it will be perceived as legitimate. Conversely, when challenges of an ideological nature appear this can be destabilizing especially if these group or groups begin to gain in size and support (Alagappa, 1995, p. 18).

Secondly, the rulers or government within a given country must conform to established rules within the society (Alagappa, 1995, p. 21). The military will operate in many areas where the government or authority structures operate along traditional lines regardless of the facades erected to facilitate the appearance of a modern government. Afghanistan provides an excellent present day example of this. In these instances, the formal system may not have nearly the influence necessary for legitimacy, instead traditional ties and practices remain. When this occurs, performance becomes essential. Afghanistan, again, provides the example. Here the government is trying to break the traditional systems but its performance thus far has not allowed it to do so effectively.

Performance of the government falls directly under what Alagappa cites as the third key to legitimacy, which is the proper use of power. This comes in the forms of the government operating within the law or accepted rules and performance. A government gains legitimacy if the government's power is attempting to act on the people's behalf. However, when the government's use or perceived use is for personal gain at the expense of the people authority begins to fall away. Many governments of the world are seen in

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<sup>2</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, author of *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority* gives a very detailed explanation and analysis of legitimacy particularly regarding meaning and nature. Understanding legitimacy is key to understanding the intricacies of small-scale operations.

this light, most notably in Africa. Not unlike adhering to accepted rules, performance can also lend itself to legitimacy and poor performance can do just the opposite (Alagappa, 1995, p. 22).

Consent of the governed is the fourth element of legitimacy and this is given solely by the people. Without consent, there is no authority with the government as a whole. Alagappa also states that mere participation in elections in and of itself does not alone grant consent. This participation must be in tandem with belief in the principles and participation within the process and procedures of the system in place (Alagappa, 1995, p. 23). Consent is considered given if orders from the government or laws are actively obeyed. This means that while an individual may not agree with the law, they conform accordingly.

Examining aspects of legitimacy brings to light many of the issues governments face within the emerging environment. The types of societies within this environment are experiencing problems in one or more of the four key elements of legitimacy. In these instances, the creation of force packages tailored to suit not only the needs of the governments, but also the expectations of the people are required. While “a large-scale presence is warranted to provide security to a population,” as outlined by the 2009 Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report it may not be accepted by the society at large. A large-scale deployment of GPF forces could essentially peel away any further aspects of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, as the government must now rely on outside actors to provide what a solid government would on a natural basis. Our goal in these cases should always be to enhance what is already there. Even small-scale deployments can have an effect on legitimacy, especially if these forces are unfamiliar with the area and its customs. By not having the knowledge of social norms the force can delegitimize itself and the government it is trying to aid.

The host nation in a conflict or shaping operation must be willing to accept U.S. support. More importantly, the insurgents cannot use this U.S. support to further delegitimize the government in power (Maxwell, 2008). These instances of deployment within the emerging threat environment will involve allies or areas of U.S. national interests where internal conflict has destabilized a partner nation necessitating American

military intervention (David, 2008, p. 18-20). The sheer size of the BCT complement makes the likelihood of a BCT deployment improbable. The Philippines was prepared to reject more than 200 U.S. personnel. AFRICOM comprised of approximately 1,300 personnel cannot find a home in Africa because of the belief it militarizes policy towards the continent (Volman, 2008). A BCT has approximately 3000-3500 soldiers and is simply not structured or trained to the degree of Special Operations forces to allow them to deploy a small element and achieve the same results. Consequently, when a BCT deploys usually the whole structure goes with it. Moreover, since perception can be a powerful force, the mere possibility of our forces being seen as occupiers, in either size or structure, must be avoided at all costs. Further, being perceived as unwilling to adhere to local customs is equally as damaging.

In the most likely operational scenario of a friendly or allied country requiring assistance to deal with an insurgent threat, this “Dual Headquarters” configuration fails. Further, the placement of this new brigade under U.S. Forces Command will give over 80% of the Civil Affairs force to an element of the Army that is operating in less than 20% of the globe (United States Special Operations Command, 2009). Active Civil Affairs skills are not honed at the Joint Readiness Training Center or National Training Center. True tactical skill in the Active career field only comes through operating within the target culture or area. This is due to their need to work in close proximity to the population, coupled with their limited generalist skill sets. Brigade Combat Teams, outside of invasion/occupation will likely not give this opportunity to Civil Affairs forces. The J33 United States Special Operations Command estimates that if this new brigade falls under U.S. Forces Command, conventional Civil Affairs will have more Civil Affairs forces at their disposal than can be properly utilized in the mid- to long-term. This produces limited gains with an uncertain application for future usage.

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#### **IV. ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSED ARMY CHANGE ("SINGLE HEADQUARTERS")**

*Force has no place where there is need of skill.*

—**Herodotus**, *The Histories of Herodotus*  
*Greek historian & traveler (484 BC - 430 BC)*

Under the single and unitary Headquarters of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the Army can create both depth, within Civil Affairs by assigning units where they are most needed, and flexibility for application. As shown below, under this “Single Headquarters” U.S. Army Special Operations Command configuration, there will now be two battalions culturally and linguistically aligned for every Area of Operations, instead of just one. While this configuration cannot guarantee regional alignment, it does give additional depth not found in the “Dual Headquarters” configuration. This depth comes from having more Civil Affairs personnel and units concentrated in one command. In turn, this depth will allow for more flexibility in terms of support, meaning the Army will have a wider array of options with which to utilize this force. Historically, this paradigm has always held USASOC as the force provider for conventional operations, and the “Single Headquarters” configuration is in keeping with that paradigm. By having this additional depth and flexibility, USASOC can continue to accomplish this mission and its own. To date, units within FORSCOM have not fallen under the operational control of USASOC. In Afghanistan, as soon as conventional forces arrived, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force immediately fell under the operational command of conventional forces. This means that any Civil Affairs forces under FORSCOM would likely be unavailable to support special operations missions.




Figure 5. SOF “10-Forward” Model with current MTOE

The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration is noticeably different from the “Dual Headquarters” Option due to the number of Civil Affairs units available for operations. The scenario depicted in the previous chapter and the earlier representations still exist, however, when the two battalions deploy, there are eight left in reserve. Two of these belong to the same regional alignment as the battalions deploying with conventional forces. These “stay behind” forces could then be utilized by USASOC.

Despite their recent increase in size, the Active Civil Affairs are still only able to meet less than half of the USASOC mission requirements due to a shortfall of forces (Hartzel, 2008). Even with the approved growth, Active Civil Affairs will not meet the needs of the Special Operations Community (United States Special Operations Command, 2009). In fact, these forces will not even be able to meet a 1:1 dwell ratio, based on current projections. A 1:1 dwell means that for every year deployed the unit or team should receive one year at home. Unfortunately, the mission demand is such that this will not likely happen for Civil Affairs personnel operating within USASOC. As stated, this is even with the projected growth currently taking place. Meanwhile, outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, Civil Affairs units would have an uncertain future mission under U.S. Army Forces Command.

The “Single Headquarters” SOF alternative will also increase both the utility of the Civil Affairs Team (CAT) and Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). According to USASOC, there are approximately 330 ODAs that could benefit from the support of a CAT. The Commander’s In-extremist Force (CIF) companies or Direct Action teams are eliminated from this equation, as they would not necessarily benefit from the use of a CAT. As previously stated, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is requesting under the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Roles and Missions Review to expand to six companies per battalion and six CATs per company. If this growth is approved that will give the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade 180 CATs for the brigade.




Figure 6. SOF “10-Forward” Model with QDR MTOE Request

This new brigade is to have the same Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) as the 95th and if that includes the most recent growth requested, filling both to capacity, the Army would have a one for one match CAT to ODA. This also leaves an additional 30 CATs to fill Civil Military Support Elements requirements around the world. This would allow a continual, habitual relationship to develop between every ODA and CAT. It allows the ODA to focus on a smaller mission set and allows for easy delineation between lethal and non-lethal operations. In short it allows interoperability to become a given thereby increasing the overall utility of each and

ultimately allowing each team to become more effective tools in their environments. However, having this new Civil Affairs brigade under the command of USASOC does not mean the conventional forces cannot utilize them.

When only the 96th CA Battalion was extant, one team within its Echo Company was always prepared to support the Rapid Deployment element of the 82nd Airborne Division. This type of support could again be established, only on a wider scale. Under this proposal, if needed, any non-deployed Civil Affairs company within either brigade would be prepared to support any deploying conventional unit. This will provide a “bridging force” or entry unit in order to make initial assessments, and provide necessary Civil Affairs support until such time security is established, allowing a transition to Reserve Civil Affairs forces. This will also reduce the dwell time issues of the Reserve Civil Affairs component.<sup>3</sup> Dwell time refers to the prescribed inactive time a Reserve unit must have between deployments or any other instance that would cause activation of the unit. As needed, the supporting Civil Affairs elements could rotate in their GPF support, supporting GPF and SOF deploying into assigned areas of operation, cutting down on language and regional skill loss. Additionally, having two brigades for each combatant command increases the odds the support received will be from the correct region. As seen in the “10-Forward” Model slides, there is no way to achieve this under the “Dual Headquarters” model. In short, maintenance of regional orientation is much more likely under the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration. The situation described here will be unlike the surge in Iraq when Active Civil Affairs Teams, regardless of regional specialty, were tasked to provide needed support to GPF.

By having a ready-made “bridging force” within the Active Civil Affairs, units to be used as needed for each rotation the Reserve Civil Affairs forces can begin to focus on their functional specialties. As outlined in Appendix A, over the last eight years, there has been a definite shift in the Reserves both doctrinally and operationally away from the functional skills to general skills. Once the drawdown begins in the current large-scale

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<sup>3</sup> Current dwell ratios are 1:2 for Active Civil Affairs forces and 1:5 for Reserve Civil Affairs forces. However, neither the Active nor the Reserve Civil Affairs components have met these guidelines. The Reserve Civil Affairs Component’s current dwell ratio is 1:2.2 while the Active Civil Affairs Component’s dwell ratio is 1:8.

conflicts and the strain lightens on both the Reserve Civil Affairs forces and the conventional forces this new Active Civil Affairs brigade will be positioned to provide support for USASOC. This will provide USASOC with the forces needed to fill their validated future mission shortfall. Additionally, in the long term it will allow for the structures and measures to be instituted, which in turn will lead to habitual support for the conventional forces by the Reserve Civil Affairs component. As will be shown later, only the Reserves have the capacity to provide habitual relationships to conventional BCTs.

By aligning the Reserves to the Brigade Combat Teams, the Active Civil Affairs component can remove its personnel from these units at the Brigade level. This will free up needed individuals to fill strategic planning and liaison positions currently lacking within the Active force. In turn, the BCTs receive personnel that can link them with their actual supporting unit. If this is not done this strategic capacity may not emerge until after the growth is complete, due to the present deficits within the Active Civil Affairs component. Additionally, actual internal support to the BCTs may drop as personnel fill needed positions within both brigades. Explanation of this issue and course of action requires further discussion, which is provided in the following chapter.

By planning for the most likely scenario in the emerging environment, the Army can produce a force attuned to the environment with the depth to enable the support to be regionally aligned to the area of operations and the flexibility to support SOF, but able to adapt if conventional forces are required. In the previous chapter, legitimacy and sovereignty concerns within the most likely environment were discussed, now the skills required to succeed will be examined. Early intervention is crucial to success in this arena of counterinsurgency. An emerging insurgency is much more easily defeated than one more mature (Warner, 2007, p. 75). In most cases, the insurgents are formulating their cause, gathering support and learning through trial and error adequate guerrilla tactics (Warner, 2007, p. 75). After identifying the threat, a decision needs to be made concerning the force package required. This force package should be aligned both regionally and linguistically with the area of operation.

Realizing that no two insurgencies will ever be completely the same, due to the societies in which they reside, the force package should have the requisite skills to operate within that specific area. However, since the causes of insurgency are common, this force must also be adept at utilizing the practices best suited to combat the root issues. To determine which forces have the skills in this arena “best practices” in an insurgent conflict require examination. By utilizing a comparative edge analysis it can then be determined what forces best fit the needed mold.

Comparative edge analysis is accomplished by looking at the needed action and then making a determination as to the element best suited to perform the task based off attributes inherent within the force. The force or element that contains the most attributes in regards to the action therefore has the comparative edge. The actions listed below from RAND will be examined and discussed to show why the SOF element is best suited for that role. This is not to say others cannot accomplish the action, but in all likelihood will not accomplish it as quickly or efficiently.

A RAND Counterinsurgency Study identifies these as the following:

ACTION	FORCE
<b>Adaptability</b>	<b>SOF</b>
<b>Military and Civilian Agencies Working Together</b>	<b>CA</b>
<b>Civic and Humanitarian Actions</b>	<b>CA</b>
<b>Culturally Appropriate PSYOP Campaign</b>	<b>PSYOP</b>
<b>Use of Indigenous Forces</b>	<b>SF</b>
<b>Intelligence</b>	<b>SOF</b>
<b>Troops in Close Proximity to Population</b>	<b>SOF</b>
<b>Adequate Police Force</b>	<b>SF</b>
<b>Enhanced Cultural and Language Skills</b>	<b>SOF</b>
<b>Political Option Open to Insurgents</b>	<b>HOST NATION</b>

Taking the RAND listing into account SOF forces most closely align to the needs of a micro-insurgent environment. Since SOF usually operates in an autonomous manner, they have the ability to adapt to situations as needed. Conventional forces tend to take longer to adapt than SOF as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this period for adaptation comes with a high price in losses to American military personnel and overall cost. Iraq devolved into insurgency soon after major combat operations ceased; it was not until 2007 that conventional forces began adjusting their operational tactics. In Afghanistan, this adaptation is still taking place. Each situation will provide some lessons learned and will be beneficial others will not causing additional adaptation in each new area visited. These practices will be helpful but only to the degree in how they are applied. In other words, these practices must conform to the targeted society, to do that the forces need to be regionally and culturally aware.

Civil Affairs personnel routinely act as a liaison between military and civilian agencies and carries out civic and humanitarian actions. Psychological Operations Forces will conduct a culturally appropriate PSYOP campaign since they like all SOF all are language trained with regional orientation. Use of indigenous forces and a hands-off approach to combat operations is the epitome of the Special Forces mission and no other element within the U.S. military is as proficient at the mission. They have demonstrated this across the globe, most recently in the Philippines. Enhanced language and cultural skills can build trust faster and lead to increased cooperation on the part of the population (Warner, 2007, p. 73). Both are inherent qualities within all SOF: Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Special Forces members.

This increased trust and cooperation between SOF and the population allows these forces to base in close proximity to the population, unlike their conventional counterparts who continue to base large portions of their forces on expansive forward operating bases. These SOF units also come with their own intelligence apparatus and are familiar with operating in conjunction with embassies and country teams. While conventional forces also have their own intelligence apparatus utilizing these components in conjunction with country teams and embassies, would be something new and again would require an adaptation period.

Ensuring an adequate police force is something that either Special Forces or a Military Police (MP) Company could accomplish. Each has the requisite skill to facilitate this, but the advantage given the situation must go to Special Forces. Special Forces will have the in-country experience to draw from, something the MPs will not have at their disposal. This is not a police force in the traditional sense, but more of a constabulary one based on local needs. Field Manual 3-05.137 Army Special Operations Forces Foreign Internal Defense p. B3 describes the use of such a force. A traditionally western notion of a police force would require something other than just MPs or Special Forces. This would require Reserve Civil Affairs perhaps working in combination with MPs or Special Forces.

Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological Operations each provide an essential component in conducting COIN. No one element can operate alone in an insurgent environment as effectively as it can with the other two. Having Civil Affairs provides an element solely focused on the population, Psychological Operations directly attacks the will of the insurgency and promotes legitimacy of the government. Special Forces in turn builds, trains and advises needed indigenous forces to establish more government control. If any of the three is missing from the equation it forces the others to operate in areas outside of their expertise. It is working in tandem that increases their overall utility. With their regional and language skills, they are able accomplish these tasks at the lowest level.

Special Operations Forces already have the skills to operate in their designated areas, and do not require any additional training. Nor will they need time to adapt to the operational environment. They are comfortable operating in politically sensitive areas, utilizing country teams and the embassy. With the Theater Special Operations Command and the embassy engaged the goal is to insert these forces for early intervention. Tailoring the SOF force presents little problem, as all are components of counterinsurgency, but some instances may require more of one and possibly less of another. More importantly, these forces, due to the small sizes in which they usually operate and the skills they bring, will not detract from the legitimacy or sovereignty of the host government simply by their presence.

Historically, during peacetime, SOF has always had a higher operational tempo than their GPF counterparts and there is nothing on the horizon to suggest a change to this. When dealing with irregular threats it is essential to have the capability for a bottom up approach. A bottom up approach must have personnel that can interact with the populace at the lowest levels to build rapport and capacity. Due to their regional and language skills, Civil Affairs are among these forces. A bottom up approach becomes more effective if done in a preemptive fashion. In doing so relationships are formed and trust built before an internal crisis gains momentum (Rothstein, 2007). Forces under SOF conducting their missions worldwide are already accomplishing this task. Manning the force that will conduct these operations with adequate tools allows for a more effective and flexible military option.

Instead of splitting Civil Affairs, the Army should be consolidating these units under one command. This will not eliminate all issues but nor will it add to the list of problems. By having all Civil Affairs under USASOC gives greater depth and flexibility to address the unexpected but more importantly brings the elements in line with the most likely future deployments. These deployments will not look like Iraq and Afghanistan but instead will look more like the Philippines and Colombia. These are small footprint and preventive using a combination of forces specifically trained for their role. Since these operations involve a small amount of resources, the small footprint can be sustained over long periods of time, which is important when attempting to counter or destroy an established terrorist network or an insurgency (Feickert, 2005, p. 15, 16).

Organizationally, the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration allows central command and control of the new Civil Affairs forces to remain the same; there is no need to establish new C2. Additionally, it would mitigate if not solve the shortfall of mission requirements within USASOC. Placing the unit under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration simply transplants the same issues of regional and language skill loss present within the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade to another command without addressing the issues. Additionally, under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration there is no well-defined mission for the brigade outside of current operations, this is not the case under the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration.

When conventional forces within Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced, in all likelihood, the requirements for USASOC will continue to increase if history is any indicator. SOCOM future models also bear this out. In the “Dual Headquarters” configuration having filled the critical short-term need these Civil Affairs forces could find themselves without missions, and with severe regional skills atrophy, meanwhile USASOC would still have its mission shortfall. With both brigades under SOF, even if the additional personnel and structure requested by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade within the upcoming QDR was denied, USASOC could still maintain regional alignment, although should they be needed the soldiers rotating in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan would only be at a 1:1 dwell.

The placement of the new Civil Affairs brigade within Special Operations, while better overall than the “Dual Headquarters” configuration, does have several deficiencies. One issue is that conventional units will more than likely not be able to train with their aligned Reserve units prior to deployment in the near term. However, once the operational tempo begins to decline, Reserve dwell issues will also erode making this much less of a problem. This alignment combined with the Active Civil Affairs “bridging force” will give the conventional forces adequate capacity to conduct full spectrum operations. The use of both Active and BCT aligned Reserve Civil Affairs will give the conventional forces both the low-end skills of the generalist for initial engagement and the high-end skills of the functional specialist to ensure the peace.

The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration will not solve the issues of expansion within the training base, but it will leave no question as to the structure of the training pipeline. As shown in the following chapter, the shortfall of Civil Affairs trainers can be addressed through alternate measures. Further, the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration will not alleviate the personnel shortages issues also discussed later, but it will eliminate any internal competition for resources at the company, battalion and brigade level. By allowing the unit to come from the same pool, so to speak, the two units can work in tandem with each other instead of directly against the mission readiness of its sister brigade. In short, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would continue filling until units were ready to break off to the new brigade. In addition to assisting the approaching

personnel problems, it would also alleviate many of the equipment issues that will come to the forefront. This approach, used effectively throughout the current growth of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is easily applied to this situation with no loss to mission only potential gain.

In order to combat the personnel problems the 95th used a technique referred to as internal slicing. For example within the 95th, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion continued to fill internally until it began to go beyond its personnel authorizations. When this occurred, the excess was then sliced off to create the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion. In order to overcome equipment issues the equipment was “hot bunked” between teams. As one team or company returned from deployment, their equipment was inventoried, and immediately signed over to another element preparing to deploy. These solutions, unfortunately, are not available under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration due to the separation of the units. As will be shown in the following chapter, Civil Affairs branch is already operating at a deficit of personnel; two competing units will amplify this and make it more pronounced.

The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration will also not give the conventional forces continued access to the regional and language skills inherent within the Active Civil Affairs. Their “bridging force” will have this, but the Reserve follow-on forces will not. While some language and regionally ability is within the Reserve Civil Affairs units, no recent training model has ever fully supported this (Mundell, 2007). Due to the lack of functional skills within the Active forces, it is essential they have the ability to imbed at the local level. Following on the gains by the Active forces the Reserves should not require these skills, and it should not adversely affect their mission. Providing security is established, the skills brought by the Reserve Civil Affairs personnel should more than compensate for their lack of regional and language proficiency.

While neither option is perfect, the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration is markedly more flexible and comes closest to addressing the current and future needs of both the Civil Affairs branch and the Army. Each option, however, fails in two areas of particular importance and those areas are habitual support to the conventional forces and the ability of the Active Civil Affairs to create a strategic presence.

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## V. DEFICIENCIES WITHIN EACH OPTION

The Active Civil Affairs forces due to their size cannot solve the problem of habitual support to conventional units; the only solution for this is the restructuring of the Reserves. In order to create consistent support within the conventional forces, the Reserve Civil Affairs units must be aligned to BCTs. This was to have occurred after the split in 2006, but did not happen. The conventional forces both need and deserve proper habitual support. At no time should a BCT commander have to wonder where their Civil Affairs support originates from and what capabilities this Civil Affairs unit will have. Only the Reserve Civil Affairs has the capacity to provide this missing component. There are currently 71 Active and Guard BCTs. An active duty brigade can only provide consistent support to 30 BCTs, meaning 41 Active and Guard BCTs will not have this type of support. In an internal split, whereby Active GPF Civil Affairs will only support Active BCTs, this brigade still cannot support all units in a consistent fashion. Thirteen still will not have habitual support. Additionally there would be 84 Reserve Civil Affairs companies without a unit alignment. This route would require further restructuring of the Active/Reserve Civil Affairs mix. By contrast, the Reserves can, on paper support approximately 112 BCTs (Department of Defense, 2009, p. 8). This is not counting their proposed growth of an additional 20 companies.

The phrase “on paper” is used because there are currently many requirements the Reserves are filling outside of the BCTs, which directly affects their ability to provide support. Requirements such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Kosovo are but two examples. An in depth review should be taken of all current and competing obligations currently occupying the Reserve Civil Affairs that inhibit them from aligning with conventional units. A determination is needed as to which missions can be eliminated or perhaps turned over to Active Duty Civil Affairs, another component or government agency. End Strength of Reserve Civil Affairs units is also a limitation, suggestions for improving this are provided in the attached Appendix (Hartzel, 2009).

In order to form a complete match between the Reserves and the conventional BCTs, the Reserve Civil Affairs would need at least a 2:1 ratio for each supported

conventional unit to allow for dwell time. However, the addition of a “bridging force” would gain some ground. Historically, the Active Civil Affairs units have provided this “bridging force.” Under this scenario, anytime a GPF unit deployed, an Active Civil Affairs element would act as the “bridging force.” In turn, this would cut down on dwell issues and allow Civil Affairs to return to an historical model of usage. However, with the Reserves scheduled growth of 20 companies, their ability to support goes up to 132, missing the mark of the ratio by only 10. Thus, the solution provided here is imperfect; but an imperfect solution is far better than the current state of ad hoc confusion.

While this solution is imperfect, it also comes closest to aligning the change to the needs of both the SOF community and the GPF community in their likely environment. SOF by design will usually operate in areas that have a governmental structure and a military with which to work. In a preventive landscape, this means the emphasis will be on the skills the Active Civil Affairs provide. Essentially these forces are adding to what already exists not necessitating the construction of an entirely new capacity.

The conventional forces conversely still have a primary mission of find, fix, and destroy. Due to this, they have a limited need for Active Civil Affairs skill sets but, over time, an expanded need for Reserve Civil Affairs skills. The Balkans provides an excellent example of this. This expanded need comes after the establishment of security and the conventional forces begin to ensure the peace, which tends to require much more time. Iraq is a prime example of this. By tailoring Civil Affairs to the overall needs of the forces success for each is much more likely (Daft, 2004, p. 413). The course of action discussed here could be achieved under either the “Dual Headquarters” GPF or the “Single Headquarters” SOF option, but only the latter aligns the Active Civil Affairs to the likely environment and provides enough depth combined with flexibility to confront the anomalous events possible. This depth under the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration also provides the best opportunity for Civil Affairs personnel to retain their regional and language skills. The other deficiency, the need for a strategic capacity within the Active Civil Affairs has been something long discussed but due to constraints has yet to come to fruition.

One reason for this lack of action stems from the personnel strength within more senior year groups (YG) for Civil Affairs. A year group is comprised of all officers commissioned during that fiscal year. The year group is then used by U.S. Army Human Resources Command to track officers throughout their career for schools, promotion, etc. This deficit of personnel will also have a spill-over effect in regards to manning the Civil Affairs brigades as most of the Civil Affairs personnel required at the battalion and brigade levels need to be experienced so these numbers must be taken into account in that regard as well.

No YGs currently holding the rank of Major are filled to 100% and even if they were these YGs were structured prior to the expansion (Human Resources Command, 2009). This means these YGs have considerably fewer officers. Under current authorizations, even without growth, this shortfall within the rank of Major will last until 2016 due to the lack of personnel (Human Resources Command, 2009). This stems from the gains to loss ratio as one YG leaves the rank of Major and another enters. The chart below from Human Resources Command, Civil Affairs branch shows the current CPTs strength per YG.

Data as of 06 SEP 09	CA Officers						
		2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
CPT	35	41	52	69	61	77	335
OPTYG CA	60	60	60	60	60	80	380
							AGG TOTAL
% On Hand	58%	68%	86%	106%	101%	96%	88%

Figure 7. Civil Affairs Captains strength by YG

As can be seen in the above chart only the more junior officers approach or pass 100% in terms of personnel, of which only the most junior (YG 2006) is structured for the expansion. The consequence of this deficit is many authorized Civil Affairs positions will go unfilled. Additionally criteria for filling many of the positions will come less

from skills and experience, instead becoming more of an availability issue. This deficit will also hamper the branch's ability to establish more personnel at the strategic level. This will continue to be a problem under both models until the junior Captains have moved up to more senior roles and the growth is accomplished, unless another approach is taken. The below chart illustrates these shortfalls within the Civil Affairs Major's population.




Figure 8. Current Major's Shortfall

One possible way to allow quicker growth in the branch's strategic capacity and level off the Major's deficit is to remove all Active Duty personnel from within the BCTs. Within each BCT, an Active Duty Civil Affairs cell serves as the commander's primary planners and liaison for Civil Affairs forces. Take out the Active Duty personnel and replace them with Active Guard or Reserve (AGR) personnel. This action will go hand in hand with aligning the Reserves to the BCTs and will free up approximately 103 Active Duty Civil Affairs officers and NCOs for reassignment (Human Resources Command, 2009). This will enable the Active Duty personnel to begin a more robust staffing at the strategic level and within governmental agencies, something currently lacking within the career field, allowing a more in-depth incorporation of Civil Affairs into Theater Security plans. Some of these personnel could also assist in the Civil Affairs training base expansion. In turn, the Reserve Civil Affairs component will have personnel imbedded into units to which they provide support. As it stands now, Active Civil Affairs personnel are advising commanders about units to which they have no

connection or knowledge in regards to inherent capabilities. This proposal would allow commanders to have personnel from the unit that directly supports their operations. This action would provide both horizontal and vertical communication to occur within both supported and supporting units, increasing their ability to conduct operations (Daft, 2004, p. 126). Unless personnel requirements are addressed and adjusted within the Active Civil Affairs branch, the career field will continue to suffer under either configuration. The chart below represents the same Major's shortfall data with the new Civil Affairs brigade factored into the equation.




Figure 9. Projected Major's Shortfall

The possible course of action discussed for the strategic presence issue is also something that could be accomplished under either the “Dual Headquarters” option or the “Single Headquarters” SOF option. Under the “Dual Headquarters” option, however, there would now be a competition of resources between the two commands, and internal slicing would not be an option. These competing demands, coupled with the already present deficit would cause further strain on Civil Affairs branch and possibly decrease its overall ability to provide proper support at higher levels of command. The needs of the likely environment would not be satisfied and Active Civil Affairs would still find themselves without depth, in all likelihood continuing to lose regional and language skills.

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## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on special operations forces' (SOF) traditional core missions and capabilities, forward global presence and employments, regional orientation, unique language skills, and cultural awareness, SOF have and will continue to be the premier implementing force for the United States' Preventive Defense – peacetime engagements designed to detect and resolve pending crises or conflict and create the conditions that support enduring peace. — General Henry Shelton, 1997.

Twenty years ago, the debate about the operational placement of Civil Affairs assets centered around two main arguments. The first argument stated that Civil Affairs operations were broader than conventional and unconventional warfare and supported both. This argument is no more valid today than it was in 1987. The same is true of all three special operations branches. While the terms are somewhat dated, each branch supports both conventional and unconventional warfare. The same is also true for conventional branches. Every branch has broader application than to just one type of warfare.

Operational placement of Civil Affairs forces within U. S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) occurred so that the career field might benefit from the unity of command and resource advocacy that only USASOC could provide. Today this is no less true, and perhaps more so. The Active Branch is less than three years old, and has absolutely no personnel over the rank of Colonel. Due to that there are no senior ranking advocates acting solely in the best interest of the young branch. There needs to be advocacy on behalf of Active Civil Affairs at the higher echelons of command. Splitting the branch now without any proper advocacy will also split any possibility of advocacy within either USASOC or U.S. Army Forces Command. This could result in the two commands attempting to represent their particular slice of Civil Affairs rather than advocating for the branch as whole.

The February 2009, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report authored by Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth argued that the original placement of Civil Affairs within Special Operations created unique challenges within the branch.

This stems from Special Operations forces focusing primarily on direct action, while the focus of Civil Affairs operations is on indirect action (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 35). To include all Special Operations forces from all four services, this would be true, but Active Army Civil Affairs primarily supports the U.S. Army Special Forces. Special Forces have never been a direct action-centric organization. Historically and today, the majority of their missions have centered on advising, training, working by, with, and through host nation militaries. In truth Special Forces has deviated little from its original mission, “to infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy controlled territory and to stay, organize, equip, train, control, and direct indigenous personnel in the conduct of Special Forces operations” (Marquis, 1997, p11). It is the action of the indigenous force, in conjunction with the access granted, and mapping of the human terrain by Civil Affairs that leads to the highest gains. This combination of the direct and indirect approaches is representative of small footprint or shaping operations.

Looking back at Civil Affairs before 1987 a researcher is likely to find terms like “dead end career field,” “backwater,” or “dumping ground.” Under Special Operations, those perceptions and characterizations have changed. It is through the placement of Active Civil Affairs within Special Operations that has allowed the force as a whole to become more professional and more robust. Complete placement of Active Civil Affairs under Special Operations would allow this to continue, and places the Army in a position to better deal with emerging threats.

## **A. CONCLUSIONS**

As the models developed for this study show, the Army benefits more from Civil Affairs within the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration than it does from having Civil Affairs under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration. While either option attempts to address the need for more Civil Affairs forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, only the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration assures use beyond that. Not having a post-conflict mission for conventional forces, a mission must be created for the new Civil Affairs brigade. This mission will need to assure regional alignment and require a command and control structure yet unseen. Need should drive creation of a unit;

missions should not require creation after the unit. Only the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration satisfies this truism and environmental requirements.

Iraq and Afghanistan are presently crucial needs, but there are other emerging requirements around the world. Unfortunately, this new Civil Affairs brigade will likely have little to no effect on operations in Iraq or Afghanistan due to the time it will take to stand up and equip the new unit. Moreover, the operational placement of this new Civil Affairs brigade must look beyond the current conflicts, less the U.S. military is again guilty of planning for the last war. These future operations will not likely be large-scale because of the factors listed in chapter two, but instead will consist of shaping operations. A direct threat to the United States is of course a necessary exception. Initially these types of operations will require forces capable of small footprint operations, with regional expertise and language skills. Due to this, these forces must be adept at working both through the embassy and with indigenous forces. Without the listed prerequisite skills, the U. S. Army may not have the ability to act in a preventative fashion in line with a country’s needs and cultural boundaries. Only within SOF are these skills, experience and training found in abundance.

The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration eliminates the competition for resources between the new unit and the existing 95th Civil Affairs Brigade in terms of personnel and equipment. Under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and this new unit would be in direct competition for limited resources. The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is already using a proven technique to allow for stand up in a resource-restricted environment, but this would be unavailable if the two units were in separate commands and locations.

The continued atrophy and loss of cultural and language skills within the Active Civil Affairs force must be reversed. If not, the regional alignment within the Active component could very well be lost, decreasing their effectiveness at the tactical and operational levels. This too, is best accomplished by the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration. As seen in the “10-Forward” Model slides the “Dual Headquarters” configuration will simply exacerbate an already present situation. A deployment rotation consisting of as little as five BCTs into the same area in a continued manner would

completely dismantle any regional alignment within the new brigade. Having a larger pool concentrated under one-command makes it easier to provide support that is actually oriented to the area of operation. To place the new Civil Affairs brigade into the “Dual Headquarters” configuration only replicates a mirror image of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade complete with inherent problems and issues. Due to this even in the unlikely situation the conventional forces deploy in large numbers the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration still is able to provide better support in terms of regional alignment. However, the second half of the original and current argument, concerning adequate support to the conventional forces must also be satisfied by any resolution.

The research recounted in this study shows that placing the new Civil Affairs brigade within the “Dual Headquarters” configuration can bring support to the conventional forces, but at substantial cost to the branch and for an uncertain mission future. However, this support will never be habitual due to the number of BCTs within the conventional force. A reasonable course of action must be determined that brings the conventional forces the support they need, while still positioning the total Civil Affairs force for the emerging environment. This thesis has provided a reasonable course of action able to achieve habitual support for conventional forces, with integrated planning capabilities. This environment may also contain future protracted insurgent conflicts if preventive measures fail which may call for the use of both Active and Reserve Civil Affairs in conjunction to achieve the desired end-state.

Since the early 1970s, Civil Affairs’ design has been for a two-stage implementation in major combat operations. The first stage consists of Active forces followed by the second stage consisting of Reserve forces after the establishment of security. Active force skills dominate in the initial phases, while Reserve force skills dominate in phases IV-V. Requiring either to operate outside of those bounds will decrease their overall utility. Regardless, each needs the other in order to be truly effective at ensuring the peace. It is in the permissive or semi-permissive environment scenario that the Reserve Civil Affairs forces find their highest utility. This was a painful lesson witnessed in Iraq from 2003-2007 and should not go unnoticed. This will also require in depth planning at the strategic and operational levels, as parts of the area of

operations may be more secure, so as not to necessitate a “bridging force.” The in-depth planning ability needed at both the strategic and operational levels will not materialize in a timely fashion unless alternative measures are taken, as shown in this study.

Other studies on Civil Affairs have reached similar conclusions regarding the future of Civil Affairs assets. The number one recommendation of the February 2009 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report authored by Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth was to reintegrate all Civil Affairs forces back under USASOC. The CSIS report correctly identifies USASOC as the most appropriate organization to act as the organizational advocate for Civil Affairs. As previously discussed, a split in this advocacy can do more harm than good for the Civil Affairs branch as a whole. The report, however, fails to document the operational impact of an increased Civil Affairs force under USASOC. Although the report issued by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments authored by Robert Martinage covers the operational impact of an increased Civil Affairs presence under USASOC in detail.

This report entitled Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and Opportunities, calls for the creation of not just one new brigade under USASOC but four brigades. Under the heading, “High Priority Investments for SOCOM’s Subordinate Commands” the report outlines the critical need within the operational environment these additional forces would fill (Martinage, 2009, p. 53–55). Four brigades would allow an increased presence around the globe, but may prove hard to facilitate due to current force caps within the military. Regardless, the placement that leads to the most utility of any new Civil Affairs forces remains the same. The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration most closely represents the depth required to ensure operational effectiveness in any environment while attempting to maintain the skills needed within the Civil Affairs career field needed to be successful.

The Army is faced with a difficult decision and it is not one of right versus wrong, but one of right versus right. This decision falls squarely into short-term versus long-term.<sup>4</sup> There is no one right answer here, only one that is more right than the other. In

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<sup>4</sup> One of the common themes of tough choices presented by Rushworth Kidder in *How Good People Make Tough Choices; Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living*.

situations where the choice is between short and long term the answer should always fall towards the long term (Kidder, 1995). In this case, the long term is the emerging environment and effects on the Active Civil Affairs branch. Both are better served by the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration. By utilizing this approach, the Army can achieve its goals of an adequate force for the present and build the force needed for the future.

This crucial juncture regarding the future structure of Civil Affairs could shape the Army’s ability to confront threats for the mid- to long-term future. A shortsighted decision now could do immense damage to one of the youngest branches in the Active Army and one of the most important in the fight against insurgent forces around the world. Taking this brigade out of USASOC and utilizing it to support GPF forces will not make these forces more SOF-like, but instead make SOF less capable of meeting emerging threats. There is no question the conventional forces need support now but this support should be tailored to allow for long-term use. To accomplish this, as the models have shown, it is imperative to pool the resources of Civil Affairs under USASOC and restructure the Reserve Civil Affairs force. Any other configuration perpetuates problems already present, furthering their damage. The long-term use will come in areas where sovereignty and legitimacy are issues; places like the Philippines and Central America. Places that by the very nature of their problems negate the BCT due to size and skills. This new organization should benefit all: conventional forces, SOF, the Army and Civil Affairs branch while positioning each for future requirements, only through the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration does this occur.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**1. Align the new Civil Affairs brigade and all Civil Affairs forces under USASOC.** For the Active Civil Affairs this will ensure a continued mission to all and stem the loss of needed regional and language skills. Under a unified branch, there will be no competition for resources or personnel. Each unit can work in tandem towards full operational capacity instead of against the other’s personnel and equipment end strength. For the Reserve component, this allows for a less convoluted command structure, and reopens MFP-11 funding (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 37). It will also give them the

needed “bridging force” in protracted engagements. The increased size of Civil Affairs under one command will increase the chances that support given to any unit, in any region will receive matching skills for the area of operations. The more robust package within USASOC will ensure the Active component stays appropriately engaged and closes USASOC’s mission gap, while maintaining enough flexibility to handle support to conventional units as needed.

Further, in the long term, this placement will allow habitual relationships between the conventional forces and the Reserve Civil Affairs. Due to the geographic location of USASOC in relation to the Reserve Civil Affairs command, direct supervision of this process is available.

As the emerging operational environment will likely involve preventive/small footprint operations this alignment of the new Civil Affairs brigade under USASOC places the additional Civil Affairs forces in the best position to engage in these situations. This configuration most closely aligns the Army with the necessary resources needed to conduct operations within sovereign, friendly nations where legitimacy is a concern. However, this option gives enough flexibility to ensure conventional forces have regional support with the capability to conduct full spectrum operations when required.

**2. Align Reserve Civil Affairs force with BCTs and increase force structure.** This was to have occurred after the split in 2006, but did not happen. The conventional forces both need and deserve proper habitual support. Only the Reserve Civil Affairs component has the capacity to provide this support. The Reserve Civil Affairs force is a key element in positioning both Civil Affairs and the Army in regards to emerging threats. The appendix attached outlines certain recommendations in achieving these goals.

Increasing the force structure of the Reserve Civil Affairs by approximately 10 additional companies will allow a 2:1 ratio BCT to aligned Reserve Civil Affairs unit. This will enable the Reserve Civil Affairs component to better provide habitual support to all conventional units Active or otherwise.

**3. Take Active Duty Civil Affairs personnel out of BCTs replacing them with Reserve personnel.** Within each BCT, an Active Duty Civil Affairs cell serves as

the commander's primary planners and liaison for Civil Affairs forces. Take out the Active Duty personnel and replace them with Active Guard or Reserve personnel. This will enable the Active Duty personnel to begin a more robust staffing at the strategic level, something currently lacking within the career field. In turn, the Reserves will have personnel imbedded into the supported units. Who better to advise a commander of a unit's capability than an actual member of that organization?

**4. Train the conventional force in rudimentary Civil Affairs operations/application and capabilities/limitations of Civil Affairs.** No model or configuration allows all to have complete and total support in a habitual fashion from Civil Affairs personnel. This may require some units, SOF and GPF, to conduct Civil Affairs activities on their own. In order to do this Civil Affairs must train the force in operations and application. Just as each soldier in the U.S. Army, from private to general, knows how to operate a radio each soldier and officer should be able to conduct rudimentary Civil Affairs operations (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 42). This is currently being done, but not with Civil Affairs instructors. While the individual may be familiar with the practices, in all likelihood they will be deficient in the intricacies and nuances of the objectives.

This instruction should also include capabilities and limitations within the Civil Affairs community. While one Active Civil Affairs Team is the same as another in terms of skills and equipment there is a wide range of differences between the Reserves and the Active component. These differences need complete understanding at all levels. This will ensure the right forces are applied to the right missions and allow for greater utility when in use.

**5. Conduct a comprehensive study of Reserve Civil Affairs requirements to determine what requirements can be eliminated and what requirements can be taken over by other military or governmental agencies.** Several requirements are currently placed on the Reserve Civil Affairs force, which directly affects their ability to support the conventional units. This study will determine non-essential requirements currently tasked to the Reserves, as well as identify any requirements for transfer to another element or agency.

## APPENDIX A.<sup>5</sup> ANALYSIS OF THE RESERVE CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPONENT

### A. BACKGROUND

From 1991 until 2006, the U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), at Fort Bragg, NC, exercised direct control over all Active and Reserve Civil Affairs forces in the U.S. Army. During this time, USACAPOC, which was an Army Reserve command, was subordinate to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). This unique relationship was tied to the fact that approximately 96% of all CA units were part of the U.S. Army Reserve, as well as 66% of all Psychological Operations forces.

On 12 January 2004, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who was concerned about the increasing violence in Iraq, issued an internal memo, known as a “snowflake,” to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Meyers. The memo asked, “Should Civil Affairs forces be removed from USASOC and placed in direct support of General Purpose Forces (GPF)” (Ricks, 2005). At the time of this request, the majority of USASOC units were engaged in Direct Action missions against known and suspected terrorist targets, a mission set that rarely required Civil Affairs support. The Secretary of Defense thought that Civil Affairs forces could be better utilized in a direct support role to GPF.

The Army attempted to meet the spirit of the Secretary of Defense’s request by moving Reserve Civil Affairs forces from USASOC to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and aligned with GPF maneuver brigades. The active Civil Affairs component, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, would remain under USASOC (Ricks, 2005). The anticipated result would be increased Civil Affairs support to GPF because they would have the bulk of the force, approximately 96%, committed to conventional missions. The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion would remain in USASOC in order to retain

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<sup>5</sup> This appendix is the work of the author, 2009.

the long-term relationships between the battalion and the five active duty Special Forces Groups. Additionally, the 96th would eventually expand into a Civil Affairs Brigade in order to fulfill future USASOC requirements. The separation of Active and Reserve Civil Affairs took place in June 2006, an event now commonly known as “the divorce.”

This appendix will examine USACAPOC in its current configuration and determine how well it fits into its new role supporting GPF. This appendix will only focus on Civil Affairs forces, thus no examination of Psychological Operations will be provided.

## **B. MISSION**

USACAPOC’s mission statement is, “To man, organize, train, equip, and resource Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces for worldwide support to combatant commanders and other agencies, as directed.”<sup>6</sup> However, as will be shown the training received by Reserve Civil Affairs does not support this regional concept, thereby negating USACAPOC’s basic structure, which is designed to fulfill this mission statement. By examining the organization, training, environment and the prescribed capabilities outlined in FM 3-5.40 Civil Affairs Operations, one can see that USACAPOC and the Army would be much better served if the structure and organization were modified. This modification will cause the creation of a new mission statement that incorporates the conditions of the 2006 realignment and the limited regional ability that actually exists within the Reserve Civil Affairs.

## **C. ORGANIZATION**

USACAPOC is organized as a divisional structure, with four Civil Affairs Commands (CACOM), and supporting brigades and battalions as seen in Figure 10.

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<sup>6</sup> This mission statement taken directly from the command overview brief for the Civil Affairs Association by MG David A. Morris, commander USACAPOC, dated 8 November 2008.




Figure 10. Internal Organization

According to Henry Mintzberg, noted academic in the field of organizational design, an organization divisionalizes because its product lines are diversified, above all other reasons (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 9). USACAPOC, as shown above, is regionally aligned with all combatant commands in order to provide regional and cultural expertise for the supported commanders. However, as will be shown, the reality is USACAPOC does not have the inherent skills to provide this aligned support. The current skills within USACAPOC better match those of U.S. Forces Command, which makes the organization more attuned to provide support to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as outlined in 2006. These BCTs are not regionally aligned, and therefore, do not require a diversified regional product line. Moreover, as will be shown, no training model has ever supported this type regionally aligned configuration.

Additionally, the current configuration contains no horizontal linkages between the supported Brigade Combat Teams and USACAPOC. Consequently, a Civil Affairs unit and a BCT do not have an established working relationship, nor will they have conducted any joint training exercises prior to deploying. Horizontal communication helps to overcome barriers and provides for coordination to achieve unity of effort (Daft, 2001, p. 126). Two of the strongest horizontal linkages possible for the Civil Affairs unit are the full time integrator and teams (Daft, 2001, p126). Currently, each BCT has a

Civil Affairs planning cell, who serves as the full-time integrator and team. However, these members are active duty personnel, with no connection to any Reserve Civil Affairs units. A possible solution would be to replace the active duty officer with a member from the Active Guard or Reserve (AGR). The AGR BCT Civil Affairs officer would serve as the integrator while the AGR NCOs serving within Civil Affairs planning cell would comprise the team. Ideally, this would give the BCT commander a direct link to his supporting Civil Affairs unit, thus helping to coordinate training and other necessary activities prior to deployment.

This configuration will not give a link between the BCT and the Active Civil Affairs Team that will provide the “bridging force” to the Reserves. This is mitigated by the fact that all Active Civil Affairs Teams come with the same skill sets, resources, and training. Reserve units come with many varied skills sets; it is here that the linkage is the most important. This adjustment to the coordination between the BCT and the Civil Affairs unit would lead to a more stable relationship between the two organizations. The BCT Civil Affairs Planning cell becomes a support staff for both the Civil Affairs unit and the BCT. The planning cell simplifies the overall work process of communications, resourcing, and training for both units involved. It would also help to mitigate a problem discussed later and that is the misuse of Civil Affairs personnel, but first the internal training aspects need to be examined.

#### **D. TRAINING**

Under the current training guidelines of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School, the Reserve training program is supposed to produce an adaptive and culturally aware leader. This is in addition to mastering the tradecraft of tactical Civil Affairs operations (Mundell, 2007). However, while USACAPOC is structured for a regionally diversified output with regional expertise and linguistic capability, the training pipeline is not equipped to provide this output. All products of both current and past training were not diversified regionally and did not receive additional language training. Over the previous five years, there have been three different Reserve training models, and each will be covered.

The first example for Reserve Civil Affairs training is the pre-2004 model. This model, which all Reserve Civil Affairs officers trained under, was the standard from the inception of USACAPOC in 1991 until 2005. Newly minted Civil Affairs officers had to attend the 4 week Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) in resident status, or attend the Reserve Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course (CAOAC), which consisted of a resident and non-resident portion. After completing either of these programs, the graduate was a fully trained Reserve Civil Affairs officer. This training pipeline is depicted in Figure 11.




Figure 11. Initial Training Pipeline (Mundell, 2007)

The pre-2004 Reserve Civil Affairs training pipeline offered minimum training time in comparison to the conventional Officers Advanced Course, which averages six months in length. Instead, it is more similar to the Reserve Judge Advocate General's Advanced Courses, which is a 2-week course in Fort Lee, VA ([www.jagcnet.army.mil](http://www.jagcnet.army.mil)). This pipeline offered minimum training because it relied on the presumption that the Reserve Civil Affairs officer already possessed necessary professional skills. In addition, the pre-2004 model offered regional specialties and languages by exception only. In summary, the Civil Affairs officer's functional skills were more desirable than advanced soldiering skills.

A functional Civil Affairs soldier maintains one or more of a set of highly prized civilian skills that translate well into Civil Affairs operations. These skills include, but

are not limited to, public administration, law enforcement, community health, and/or city planning. As a reservist, the Civil Affairs officer maintains these skills every day in their civilian careers. During military operations, these skills translate well into the functional roles of capacity building, sustainment, and reconstruction.

Additionally, the active military is not equipped to maintain a high degree of proficiency in advanced Civil Affairs activities as practiced by functionalists. Thus, the active military focuses on training generalists, who are capable of ensuring immediate life sustaining measures, such as well emplacement or the delivery of humanitarian aid. While helpful in the immediate term, the generalist is not equipped to facilitate reconstruction or large-scale capacity building. In 2005, the Reserve Civil Affairs Qualification Course was modified to provide more regional focus.




Figure 12. Transformed Training Pipeline (Mundell, 2007)

The 2005–2007 Reserve Civil Affairs training model was designed to give the Reserve officer the same training as Active Duty, less the language requirement. This model fit well into the structure of USACAPOC by giving regional exposure and the core competencies of the Civil Affairs branch but required a high degree of resident training not allowing it to be user friendly for the Reserve component. Due to the restraints of

this model, its usage only lasted approximately two years. Ironically, this training model most closely fits into the desired end state necessary for the overall structure of the organization as a whole. Despite the close fit, the training again changed in 2008 due to its limitations in feasibility.

The newest Reserve Civil Affairs training pipeline involves 4 phases, two resident phases and two distance-learning phases. The initial phase (Phase I) is a distance learning module consisting of Basic Branch skills, knowledge and ability and must be completed in three months. Phase II is a resident course that teaches the core competencies of the Civil Affairs career field. These core competencies include populace and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, civil information management, and support to civil administration. Phase III shifts back to distance learning; in this phase, systems of systems analysis, civil affairs systems analysis and civil affairs planning are taught and students have eight months to complete the phase. Phase IV is a three week resident course involving civil affairs review and integration into the military decision making process followed by a culminating exercise (Mundell, 2007). At no point during this course are regional and language skills taught or enhanced despite both being necessary to support the current USACAPOC structure. This training pipeline is depicted in Figure 13.




Figure 13. Current Training Pipeline (Mundell, 2007)

The number one goal for this current training pipeline, as stated by the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, was to produce a competent Civil Affairs Team Leader (Mundell, 2007). This stated goal indicates a shift from a functional skill set (specialist) to an emphasis on tactical level operations (generalist). This change in focus was a fundamental mistake for the Reserve Civil Affairs force, for the strength of the Reserve Civil Affairs force is the civilian skills that are resident in its members, not its tactical proficiency.

The pipeline changes reflected the new demands of the operating environment. This new demand is neither surprising nor unwarranted. In 2005, as now, there are two active wars, with an insatiable demand for the limited inventory of trained Civil Affairs Soldiers. Additionally, the shift in focus reflected the reality of the time: it was much easier to recruit and train generalists than to find and retain functional experts.

Finally, there is a fourth training program, currently designed to meet the immediate needs of deploying Civil Affairs units. The Civil Affairs Course—Mobilization (CAQC-M)—was originally a 10-day program (90 training hours), designed to refresh the training of former civil affairs personnel. In 2005, the course was extended to 4 weeks and, in 2006 expanded to 9 weeks. Additionally, it was opened up to all officers being called back to duty from the Individual Ready Reserve filling a Civil Affairs billet.

Graduates of CAQC-M would immediately deploy as a Civil Affairs officer and fill a Civil Affairs role in their unit. Upon their return, the officer would receive full branch qualification in their pay grade. While CAQC-M does not encompass the whole of the CA tasks trained in the standard pipeline, it provides enough training for the officer to succeed during the deployment. Approximately 254 Army Officers were trained under this program in FY 2007 (Mundell, 2007).

The important question from the changes to the training pipeline is whether USACAPOC should train soldiers to be generalists, or to expand recruitment efforts to find specialists. If USACAPOC went for the recruitment model, it could then teach specialists about Civil Affairs and the value of their skill sets. Then, the potential recruits

could make informed decisions on whether or not to apply their expertise in the civilian sector as well as serving their country. In order to answer this question the stated internal capabilities within USACAPOC must be understood.

#### **E. INTERNAL CAPABILITIES**

Civil Affairs commands provide expertise in six functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs brigades and battalions have capabilities in four of the functional specialty areas: rule of law, governance, health and welfare, and infrastructure. These functional specialists, especially at the operational and strategic levels, may be employed in general support of interagency operations, in addition to direct support of military operations. There are no functional experts at the Company or tactical levels (3-5.40 *Civil Affairs Operations*).

Table 1. CA functional capabilities

Level of Support	Focus of Function	Focus of Capabilities	Operational Scope	Interagency
Geographic Combatant Commander — Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enable IPI and OGAs</li> <li>• Shape Operations</li> <li>• Development</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop and Build Capacity of IPI to Provide Locally Sustainable Solutions</li> </ul>	Normal Scope: International to National	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• U.S. Embassy</li> <li>• USAID OGAs</li> <li>• International Partners/Donors</li> <li>• IGOs/NGOs</li> </ul>
Corps— Operational to Strategic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Short-Term Civil Administration</li> <li>• Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Development</li> <li>• Planning, Assessment, and Implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconstruction and Development</li> <li>• Enable Civil Administration</li> <li>• Plan/Enable/Shape/Manage</li> <li>• Regionally Aligned</li> </ul>	Normal Scope: County/Large City to Subnational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• U.S. Embassy</li> <li>• USAID</li> <li>• OGAs</li> <li>• Example: CPA</li> <li>• IGOs/NGOs</li> </ul>
Division— Tactical to Operational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Short-Term Civil Administration</li> <li>• Enable HN and OGAs</li> <li>• Stabilization and Reconstruction</li> <li>• Planning and Assessment</li> <li>• CIM</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stabilization and Reconstruction</li> <li>• Enable Civil Administration</li> <li>• Plan/Enable/Shape/Manage (Execution Oriented)</li> </ul>	Normal Scope: County/Large City to Subnational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• USAID</li> <li>• Reconstruction Teams</li> <li>• OGAs</li> <li>• IGOs/NGOs</li> </ul>
Brigade Combat Team— Tactical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Plan, Assess, and Enable Local Stabilization Activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immediate HA to Prevent Crisis</li> </ul>	Normal Scope: Large City to Provincial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DART</li> <li>• OGA</li> <li>• IGOs/NGOs</li> </ul>

Published in September 2006, Field Manual 3-5.40 *Civil Affairs Operations* is markedly different from its predecessor, Field Manual 41-10. The primary difference between the two documents is the shift from the functional specialist to the generalist within the Reserve Civil Affairs.

- Previously, there were 16 functional specialties. Now, there are only six broad specialty areas.
- All capabilities of the internal structures are focused on stabilization and reconstruction except at the tactical level. Each should have a common goal. In the previous internal organization as outlined in Field Manual 41-10, this capability was inherent in all from the company level up to the Civil Affairs command.
- Each battalion was configured with one Functional Specialty Company, each consisting of 5 functional specialty teams: Public Health Team, Dislocated Civilians Team, Civilian Supply Team, Public Administration Team, and a Public Works and Utilities Team. Now, there is only a Functional Specialty Cell located within the Battalion.
- Previously there were only four generalist companies. Now, there are five generalist companies, with no specialty company.

## **F. ENVIRONMENT**

Richard Daft, author of *Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design*, defines the environment as all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization (Daft, 2001 p 48). The changing environment has played a key role in the development of USACAPOC into its current form.

Prior to 2001, the operating environment was less demanding, and placed little pressure on the organization. Operations were generally small in scale, predictable, and of relatively short duration. Bosnia and Kosovo were exceptions because of their

duration. However, the high level of security allowed for a routine rotation schedule. Without a high demand for civil affairs, the organization could easily mitigate crises or contingencies. The Army, minus Special Operations, did not see a great deal of value in Civil Affairs. Until 2001, the Army was training and preparing for a linear confrontation with a conventional enemy, a conflict where Civil Affairs would only play a minor role in post-conflict activities.

Additionally, the economic situation did not increase demand for a trained Civil Affairs force. With a vibrant job market and healthy economy, there was little to offer the professional worker to leave his job and sacrifice to serve in Civil Affairs (or the military in general). Throughout this pre-war period, USACAPOC experienced neither an excessive amount of operational strain nor a demand to aggressively train for future conflicts.

After September 11, 2001, USACAPOC's environment completely changed. The United States was now at war against an irregular-force enemy operating in Afghanistan, an extremely poor country. In 2003, the United States began operations in Iraq, which was more modern than Afghanistan, but one that had deteriorated under a decade of international sanctions and an oppressive regime. On top of this, the demands in the Balkans were still in place. By 2004, the Army had begun to shift its focus to non-linear confrontations, which placed a great deal of emphasis on Civil Affairs' role on the battlefield.

A non-linear environment places a heavy demand on functional capabilities across the entire conflict. Thus, not having this ability at every level is a severe limitation. Under USACAPOC's current configuration, all elements must be located in the same area in order to utilize their functional capability. This top-down approach to operations is ineffective in a non-linear environment (as seen from the Forward Operating Base approach in Iraq). In order to be effective in a non-linear environment, Civil Affairs teams must deploy and work among the local population. This level of employment requires functional skills at the team level, or a bottom-up approach. The technological answer, known as reach-back, is an ineffective alternative.

When the environment changes an organization is faced with two choices: redesign its structure to maintain external fit or maintain internal consistency (Mintzberg, p. 16). USACAPOC has not redesigned its structure, and it instead changed its internal consistency by placing the skills of the generalist over the skills of the functional specialist.

Reserve soldiers cannot be deployed like Active Duty soldiers. For every year a Reserve soldier is deployed, they must remain stateside for a prescribed amount of time. This constraint, known as dwell time, not only limits unit availability, but also highlights personnel shortages after high intensity or long duration deployments. Most maneuver commanders, unfamiliar in the use of Reserve Civil Affairs, wanted their contingent of Civil Affairs on-hand, in spite of the security situation in theater. In these instances, only tactical Civil Affairs teams, which can mitigate immediate suffering, are useful. Reserve Civil Affairs teams cannot conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations in an insecure environment. By demanding Reserve Civil Affairs presence in non-permissive environments, maneuver commanders inadvertently wasted their inherent strength and created dwell time issues. This, in turn, created the need to expand Civil Affairs Qualification Course-Mobilization and further fueled the emphasis on generalist skills.

## **G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

**1. Drop the regional concept for the majority of Reserve Civil Affairs units and realign their support to GPF.** USACAPOC set an admirable goal of establishing Reserve Civil Affairs units with regional alignments and cultural expertise. Unfortunately, there has never been a training model that fully supports this. This regional concept should be dropped in all elements except the Civil Affairs commands. The Civil Affairs commands directly support combatant commanders, and have established long standing habitual relationships. Civil Affairs commands would serve as intended: advisor to the combatant commander and liaison to Reserve Civil Affairs elements operating within theater. This would also allow vertical information systems to remain constant within theater.

By eliminating regional alignments, USACAPOC could begin to align their brigades and battalions with GPF units. BCT commanders should know exactly where their Civil Affairs support comes from. Once this new alignment is complete, USACAPOC can begin to assign integrators and teams within the supported units. The teams will establish horizontal linkages and build the relationships required to operate effectively.

Pre-operational training in the near-term will be an issue due to “dwell” concerns. Dwell is the term used to describe a Reserve units time in a non-activated status. Due to the high operational tempo, this has become an ever-increasing problem for the Reserve force. In the interim, the ability of the Active forces should be examined to determine the feasibility of fulfilling this role in the short term. As the operational tempo subsides, the Reserves should be able to fulfill this capacity.

**2. USACAPOC must educate the shareholder (i.e., GPF units).** To facilitate the alignment of Reserve Civil Affairs to BCTs the integrators embedded in the BCTs should begin training and educating the conventional force immediately. One function of this training should be instruction on the proper usage of Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Local commanders use their discretion to utilize CERP funds for financing low scale projects to mitigate needs within the civilian population. These tasks, normally executed by tactical Civil Affairs, could easily be taken over by maneuver rifle platoons, acting under the direct supervision of the embedded planning cell. BCT troops should have the skills to operate in this fashion in the event of a worst-case scenario.

A separate function of this education would be on how to best utilize Reserve Civil Affairs Forces. As stated earlier, security is required in order to begin stabilization and reconstruction. An Active duty “bridging force” may be required to facilitate certain aspects of operations and would be invaluable in terms of transition. Once the area is secure, the necessary components can arrive and begin operations, though coordination between the planning cell and the Civil Affairs command. This process can occur at different times in different areas of operations. The relationship between the Civil Affairs command and the Civil Affairs Planning cell is what will allow this to happen.

Proper force utilization also affects another aspect of Reserve Civil Affairs: dwell time. Dwell time, as previously stated, is necessary for Reserves. For Civil Affairs, this time in the civilian sector is vital to maintain their proficiency in their specific skill. Supported commanders must be fully aware of both the strengths and weaknesses of the forces under their control. They must understand what is required of them to ensure the greatest success. This can only be accomplished through direct communication between the Reserve Civil Affairs unit, the Civil Affairs Planning Cell, and the supported maneuver commander. If this is accomplished maneuver commanders will understand, there is no need for the bulk of the Reserve Civil Affairs compliment to be in theater unless security has been completely established. This in turn will, at a minimum, cut down on the dwell time issues being currently experienced by the Reserve Civil Affairs forces.

Another aspect of the education process would take place during pre-mobilization and training. Throughout the pre-mob process, the incoming Civil Affairs elements would receive up-to-date information from the liaison via input from the rifle platoons or “bridging force.” This would improve the unit’s situational awareness, and help them to adequately prepare to support the commander upon arrival.

**3. Aggressive recruitment and retention of functional expertise from the civilian sector is vital.** Reserve Civil Affairs forces bring one of the most important skills to any fight be it linear or non-linear: the ability to ensure the peace. Several high-ranking civilian Department of Defense officials and military officers have described civil Affairs as a crucial capability owing to its functional specialty skills (Civil Affairs Association, 2007). If these functional skills continue to decline, then USACAPOC may lose this ability.

In order to find and retain these skills, USACAPOC should aggressively target potential recruits. One possible example is to focus on economic concerns. Today’s economy is nothing like the economy of the 1990’s. One way to court potential talent is to offer direct commissions to qualified individuals. Much like the Army Judge Advocate General program and Medical Officers program, professionals with a desirable skill set and education can become a Reserve Army officer. Based on their skills, they

can start as a first lieutenant, captain, or major. Once commissioned, the new officers would attend Basic Officers Leaders Course, and then complete Civil Affairs training.

If the potential reservist possesses a valuable skill set, but does not have the necessary professional education (e.g., construction or plumbing), then the individual can join as E-4 or higher depending on experience. Following basic training, the new Soldier or Sergeant would attend Civil Affairs training. Another way would be to offer skill set bonuses. Keeping these needed skill sets and rewarding individuals for their proficiency would help in the field of retention.

These are only two examples, and are not an exhaustive list. As the economy continues to struggle, some people will look for job opportunities. Others will look for a greater purpose in their life. USACAPOC could provide them with both.

**4. Actively manage the specialties within the Civil Affairs Career Field.**

There is no fixed way to determine a Soldier's civilian specialty. Each member of the Reserve Civil Affairs career field should bring some outside complimentary skill with them. Once assessed, they should be further classified by functional specialty and supporting career field. For example, within the "Rule of Law" functional area, one could find lawyers, judges, police officers, etc. Each career field has specific education and experience requirements. This breakdown will help recruiters to pinpoint specific places and events to talk to potential recruits.

Additionally, the required expertise helps to design adequate incentive packages for potential recruits. Even more importantly, this breakdown would give USACAPOC the ability to manage specific skill sets for recruitment so they can pursue exactly what it is they need the most. This will help the command to better anticipate and support future recruiting and retention efforts.

**5. Return the emphasis on functional specialties.** The functional specialties, rule of law, governance, infrastructure, etc., are considered the "crown jewels" of Civil Affairs (Civil Affairs Association, 2007, p. 2-1). USACAPOC should not allow any training that does not take this into account. As explained, there has been a noticeable shift, both in training and doctrine, which has placed the generalist above the

functional specialist. In order to maximize its utility, USACAPOC must go back to placing emphasis on the functional teams, transforming all current Civil Affairs Teams into Tactical Functional Teams. This will maximize their utility from the bottom up.

This effort to make all Civil Affairs generalists has been faulty from the very beginning. The Active Duty side of Civil Affairs will never have the civilian skills the Reserves bring to the fight; it simply cannot train enough to meet those extremely high professional standards. Conversely, Reserve Civil Affairs will never be as tactically proficient as the Active Duty, and to expect such proficiency is dangerous. Currently, Reserve Civil Affairs forces have one of the Army's highest proportional casualty rates in the ongoing conflicts (Holshek, 2007, p 9). This is in contrast to only three Active Duty personnel killed in action, despite having been involved in the conflict for a longer duration. The more the Reserves train to be like Active Duty, the more they decrease their utility and the farther they move away from their doctrinally stated goal of providing stabilization, reconstruction, and development.

The skills of the Reserve Civil Affairs Soldier are important now, and will only become more important in the future. Thus, the organization dynamics in place now will have lasting effects if not addressed. There is a fundamental mismatch between USACAPOC's organization, training, and employment with respect to GPF requirements. USACAPOC is moving in the wrong direction, and must change course in order to maximize the effectiveness of the Reserve Civil Affairs. The current economy and the impeding force reduction in Iraq may provide the means. The ways listed within this appendix coupled with the means can equate to the desired end state: a GPF aligned USACAPOC, focused on functional skills, and ready to sustain the victory.

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## APPENDIX B.<sup>7</sup> PHILIPPINES AND COLOMBIAN CASE STUDIES

Historically SOF has always had a higher operational tempo then their GPF counterparts and nothing on the horizon would suggest a change to this. All indicators point that this will continue. When dealing with irregular threats it is essential to have the capability for a bottom up approach. This means having personnel that can interact with the populace at the lowest levels to build rapport and capacity. Due to their regional and language skills, Civil Affairs are among these forces. This becomes more effective if done in a preemptive fashion. In doing so relationships are formed and trust built before an internal crisis gains momentum (Rothstein, 2007). Forces under SOF conducting their missions worldwide are already accomplishing this task. By manning the force that will conduct these operations with adequate tools allows for a more effective military option.

### A. PHILIPPINES

Following World War II in 1946 and independence insurgencies still racked the Philippines. From the Hukbalahap Insurgency to the groups currently seen insurgency has been almost a time-honored tradition in the Philippines. However, today with the world shrinking due to globalization these groups have the ability to import tactics and techniques making them more dangerous and if left unchecked a threat to United States strategic interests.

In February 2002 the United States deployed Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) into the Philippines for Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) consisting of 160 Special Forces troops and one company of Civil Affairs (Rothstein, 2007). Force cap constraints set in place by the Philippine government did not allow for a more robust package. These troops deployed in order to work by, with and through their Philippine counterparts in order to disrupt and destroy the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), while lending legitimacy to the Philippine government. Ustad Abdurazak, Abubakar Janjalani, Wahab Akbar, Amilhussin Jumaani and 10 former members of the MNLF formed the ASG in the

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<sup>7</sup> This appendix is the work of the author, 2009.

mid-1980s (Fernandes, 2008, p. 196). Most of the leadership had spent time in the Middle East and many had received their initial training in the terrorist camps in Afghanistan, later practicing their skills against the Soviets (Rothstein, 2007). While not directly connected to al-Qaida it was Osama Bin Laden's brother-in-law who provided ASG with its initial funding (Rothstein, 2007). Located on Basilan Island this group was involved in high profile kidnappings, rape and murder in order to control the island (Wendt, 2005).

Plans for the mission to the Philippines began shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001. By Jan 2002, members of Bravo Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion had orders to send the teams first to Okinawa then to the Philippines. Once on Okinawa the teams began in depth planning with 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group to whom they were attached (Walley, 2004).

Several Civil Affairs teams were initially prevented from entering the Philippines due to the force cap placed on American personnel. Many within the Philippines felt the presence of foreign troops on Philippine soil was a violation of their Constitution. Due to this, only CAT-A23 was permitted to deploy to Basilan Island. Upon arrival, the team immediately began to do assessments of the island. Their assessments revealed that no nongovernmental organizations had operated on Basilan since 1999 and the inhabitants of the island lived in extremely poor conditions. These assessments also showed the islanders lacked educational opportunities and proper medical care after the insurgents drove out many of the teachers and medical personnel. Additionally, their water was unsafe to drink and electricity was not common (Walley, 2004).

Due to the force protection requirements, the Civil Affairs Teams operated in close conjunction with their Special Forces counterparts. A Special Forces team consists of 12 personnel, but a Civil Affairs team consists of only four. This makes it impossible to operate in a non-permissive environment without support. Collaborating with the Special Forces team not only allows for greater force protection, but also enhances the abilities of each team in terms of COIN. A Civil Affairs team is comprised of a Team Leader, Team Sergeant, Team Engineer and Team Medic. A Special Forces team usually has a Team Leader, Team Sergeant, two Weapons Sergeants, two Communications

Sergeants, an Assistant Team Leader, two Engineer Sergeants and two Medical Sergeants. Having three highly trained medics and three engineers between the teams allows each to create a greater difference within their operating environment. In an ideal situation, both teams are proficient in language and local area cultural practices.

Surveys conducted by both the Special Forces teams and the Civil Affairs teams led to a priority list of projects by the Joint Task Force. The top three on the list were potable water, improvement of medical facilities and establishing clinics, and improvement of transportation infrastructure. Potable water was of the highest priority due to the high rate of water born disease, which in turn caused a high infant mortality rate (Walley, 2004).

In the summer of 2002, Pacific Area Command (PACOM) approved the proposed Medical Civil Affairs Program (MEDCAP). As in most areas, these MEDCAPs were some of the most successful programs instituted in the Philippines. Not only do these types of operations genuinely help the people, but they also assist in building relationships with the local populace. Having additional medics allows for more people to be treated and more to be influenced. Villagers in Turburan were so grateful for the medical attention they began informing American personnel of impending ASG attacks (Walley, 2004).

By November 2003, more than 30,000 people had received treatment by MEDCAP programs set up and run by U.S. Special Operations. Navy Seabees, working through Civil Affairs had constructed a C-130 capable runway, and cleared eight helicopter-landing zones for casualty evacuation. The Seabees also repaired or improved 80 km of road, allowing greater access to the area by government forces (Wally, 2004). While these numbers are impressive, the projects in and of themselves are nothing if no effect was achieved. These projects, however, did produce the desired effect.

Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, the Philippine government was an ally of the United States and consequently a large-scale deployment of combat troops to conduct a shaping operation was not an option. The United States kept the deployment package small, with extremely restrictive rules of engagement because many within the Philippines did not want large amounts of foreign troops (Rothstein, 2007). Originally comprised of fewer

than 200 personnel, at its height JTF-510 consisted of approximately 1,200 personnel to include augmentations of navy and marine construction units to assist with civic action projects (Rothstein, 2007). By 2004, all American forces had withdrawn from Basilan Island, and the ASG had all but ceased operations in the area (Wendt, 2005). The Philippine government was also able to reduce its forces from seven infantry battalions to only two and violent incidents dropped dramatically (Rothstein, 2007). It is important to note that over the course of the engagement, according to Colonel Coultrup, current task force commander, most of the effort had been “civil-military operations to change the conditions that allow those high-value targets to have a safe haven. We do that through helping give a better life to the citizens: good governance, better health care, a higher standard of living,” (Shanker, 2009).

The Philippine case offers us an example of how Active Civil Affairs forces could expect utilization within special operations. Further, it gives a glimpse of the likely future environment in which the U.S. military can expect to operate. The Philippines were an allied country, facing an internal insurgent movement intent on delegitimizing the acting regime. Due to issues of sovereignty, the insertion of troops was small; thus ensuring acceptance by the Philippine population (Barnes, 2009). A contingent larger than the country was willing to accept or one without the proper skills could not have accomplished so much in such a short amount of time. This however, is not the only example of success from this force configuration. Colombia bears striking similarities.

## **B. COLOMBIAN CASE STUDY**

As Colombia progressed from the 19th to the 20th century, remnants of Spanish rule continued to hamper its efforts for a stable society. The Spanish created wide divisions within the society culminating in the political bodies of the Conservative and Liberal factions. The two factions were divided on the amount of governmental control necessary for the Colombian government and the extent of power the Church should have. Federalism backed by Liberals called for a weaker central government role, while centralism advocated by Conservatives consolidated power in the central government. The Liberals also felt the Church was too powerful and constricted economic and social

development, while the Conservatives believed the Church should play a central role in the state's affairs (Safford & Palacios, 2004, p. 156). These factions created the means for political violence contributing to the Civil War 1899-1902 and later to the creation of insurgent movements (Maulin, 1973, p. 14). The insurgent movements to come were not spontaneous creations, but instead more of an evolutionary process.<sup>8</sup>

The first phase is violence of political partisanship that began in 1945 and ended in 1953. The violence ignited during the electoral campaigns of 1945-46 and it is estimated that some 20,000 men were organized for the effort (Maulin, 1973, p. 6). This period is marked by partisan “cleansing” operations against communities occupied by the minority party (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 348). During these operations, constituents from either faction would attack the minority in their particular area. Such attacks invariably brought retaliation, thus escalating the violence. In some areas, the Colombian Communist Party (CCP) attempted to organize the Liberal groups (Maulin, 1973, pp. 6–7). The government never felt the state was in immediate danger, but did consider the violence enough of a threat to suspend Congress for two years, the longest interruption in the history of Colombia (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 350). This period of violence ended in 1953 with an offer of amnesty to all fighters. Most took advantage of the offer but many drifted into other areas of anti-government actions (Maulin, 1973, p. 8).

The period of 1954 through 1964 marks the second phase, which Safford and Palacios term as “mafia violence.” It is highlighted by the interference of labor on coffee farms and land markets utilizing violence as a means of economic enterprise. The goal of the factions was upward social mobility and they sought to achieve it through forcible redistribution of land and wealth (Safford & Palacios, 2002, pp. 346–347). With the Cold War in full swing and the Cuban Revolution as an example this period did not really end so much as it transformed.

As this transformation occurred so began the third phase marked by the emergence of modern day insurgent groups. It was during this time that the Ejercito de

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<sup>8</sup> In *Colombia; fragmented land, divided society* by Frank Safford and Marco Palacios write that the cycles of violence experienced by Colombia are broken down into easy-to-understand events, rather than just the Violencia and all else that follows. This gives a transitional insight to the formations of the various groups of this period beginning in 1945 and continuing into the present day.

Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) first appeared (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 354). The FARC wanted land reform in order to create a society based on the peasant farmer. Their goal was a peasant revolution stylized after the Soviet model. In response to these growing insurgent threats, the Government of Colombia supported by the United States executed Plan LAZO. Under Plan LAZO, government forces would primarily utilize civic action programs to reach the population (Rempe, 2002).

During the execution of this program the Colombian army constructed wells, instituted literacy programs, developed youth camps, and constructed schools, in addition to building clinics. In doing so, they were able to improve the lives of the populace and secure the populace against insurgent activity. Unfortunately, they did not maintain their presence allowing the guerillas to eventually reclaim these territories (Rempe, 2002). This failure allowed the fourth phase to begin.

The last era of Colombian violence begins in 1980 and continues to this day. It is marked by a combination of insurgent warfare and criminal or mafia wars (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 347). These guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitary squads worked by, with, and against one another to further their own goals. The Cali and Medellin Drug Cartels began to ravage the Colombian countryside while the FARC sought to overthrow the government. Homicide rates steadily climbed reaching 95 per 100,000 by 1993 (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 362). The FARC during this time period had split from the CCP and developed its own political and military doctrine, gained more public attention and momentum. More U.S. aid went into Colombia to fight the War on Drugs, but little seemed to help. To stem Colombia's freefall, Plan Colombia was enacted.

In 1998, the Andres Pastrana government came to power with the intent of countering the faltering economy and curbing the ever-rising violence. Plan Colombia originally was to focus on five broad areas; the peace process, the Colombian economy, the anti-narcotics strategy, reform of the justice system and protection of human rights and democratization and social development (Global Security). Peace negotiations were established with both the FARC and ELN with the creation of a wide de-militarized zone.

This included the removal of all government troops from a 16,000-mile area as a show of good faith. Despite the efforts and substantial foreign aid very little was produced towards the plan's overall goals. This changed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.

After the September 11 attacks the United States announced the increase of assistance to Colombia to include equipping anti-kidnapping and bomb squads, assisting civilian and military counter-terrorism investigators (Global Security). Pastrana also abandoned the fledgling peace process turning the focus now towards counter-terrorism efforts and returning Colombian troops to the de-militarized zone. In early 2002, the Colombian people showed their dissatisfaction with the Andres Pastrana government by voting Alvaro Uribe into office (Global Security).

Uribe's approach to the problems of Colombia would be markedly different and show a much stronger stance than his predecessor. Now there would be no more negotiations unless there was an agreed upon cease-fire. He also wanted to increase both the military and police force's capacity for dealing with Colombia's terrorist groups. Uribe specifically wanted U.S. assistance in reaching his objectives. Included in that assistance were Civil Affairs Teams and Special Forces advisors. By 2003, there were approximately 100 Special Forces advisors training the Colombian army (Simons, 2004, p. 246). Much has changed since Plan Colombia was enacted and modified towards counter-insurgency.

Since 2002, the violence in Colombia has been decreasing and by 2006, approximately 31,000 paramilitaries demobilized (CIA World Factbook, 2009). In March of 2008, the leader of the FARC died of a heart attack. That same month three of the seven principle FARC leaders were killed or captured (McDermott, 2008). Additionally in 2008, the Colombian Army freed three American hostages in dramatic fashion. Speaking of the improvements and the hostage rescue, Admiral Eric T. Olson had this to say:

For over ten years, U.S. Special Operations Forces have been advising and assisting the armed forces of Colombia in the fight against the leftist Fuerzas Armadas

Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). In recent years, the Colombian armed forces have dealt serious blows to that organization, culminating with the recent dramatic and brilliant rescue of U.S. and Colombian hostages in 2008 in an operation that was completely planned, led and conducted by Colombian forces (Olson, 2009).

The peace process enacted by Andres Pastrana was not enough to entice the insurgent forces to lay down their arms, but it did provide a possible alternative. This alternative combined with the efforts undertaken by Alvaro Uribe and the losses dealt to the movements could be the stimulus needed to bring about real change. The expanded capacity and abilities of the Colombian army will assist in dealing with hard liners unwilling or unprepared to seek a political. U.S. intervention in and of itself cannot be declared the defining factor, but it did contribute significantly. These activities gave the Colombian army increased capacity for both direct and indirect activities and more importantly never overshadowed the government or the indigenous forces.

An example of this occurred in March of 2009, when a Civil Affairs team from the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion coordinated with the Colombian Air Force to provide medical assistance to a remote region of the country damaged by recent floods. With the aid of the Colombian government, Colombian Air Force and other agencies the Civil Affairs team planned to execute a MEDCAP mission. The MEDCAP is designed to, “bring a non-threatening group that helps the people in the area and that way help establish a Colombian military footprint in an area” (Barker, 2009).

Prior to the actual event, the Civil Affairs team deployed to the area in order to assess the area. These assessments allow the team to meet with local leaders and to determine what needs to be provided to the site in terms of doctors and facilities. The team also determines what supplies are needed based on prevalent illnesses in the area. Lastly, the team assesses the security environment while there. All of the information gathered is used for planning purposes to ensure the operation both meets the needs of the people while maintaining a protective posture for the forces involved. The government treated more than 1,400 people from Malambo with the assistance of the Civil Affairs team. “For many of the patients, it was the only opportunity they would have to see specialists like optometrists, gynecologists and dentists,” said Enrique Martin, logistics

director, Colombian Civil Air Patrol (Barker, 2009). A local woman remarked, “I feel very good and satisfied with the help on behalf of the Air Force,” (Barker, 2009). The fact she thanked the government tells volumes about how this team properly executed their mission. Not only did they help the local populace, but extended the reach of the Colombian government, and bolstered the government’s legitimacy in the region.

The successes on the ground have also shown how these situations can become force multipliers for the United States in terms of coalitions. According to a recent report from CBS news, Colombia has pledged its most elite forces to aid in our ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. These forces owe their creation and training to a small footprint presence by U.S. SOF. Ten years ago, they did not exist (Logan, 2009). According to General Padilla de Leon, Colombia’s top military officer the Colombians could be on the ground as soon as August or September. This impending deployment is remarkable for several reasons. Foremost, it highlights the type of mutual respect and reciprocal relationships built through this type of operation. Secondly, it shows how much a small footprint presence of the right forces can accomplish. Thirdly, it shows that through the cumulative efforts of both indigenous forces combined with a highly trained U.S. SOF contingent improvement of a country’s situation is possible in a relatively short amount of time; improvement to the point that a deployment of forces outside their territorial boundaries is possible. This deployment is something that would have seemed inconceivable prior to Plan Colombia’s execution.

According to U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield, both terrorist attacks and kidnappings are also down. While drug production continues, (Colombia remains the number one worldwide producer of cocaine) but even here there have been improvements, with production levels down 28% (Logan, 2009). Ambassador Brownfield went further to state in reference to the operations in Colombia, “It has been the most successful nation building exercise that the U.S.A. has associated itself with perhaps over the last 25-30 years” (Logan, 2009). While far from finished, this ongoing engagement highlights the proper execution of shaping or preventative operations. Much of the Colombian operations are classified, but by Ambassador Brownfield’s use of the

term *nation building*, and not *counterterrorist operations*, it can be inferred both Active and Reserve Civil Affairs played a significant role in conjunction with other governmental agencies.

In August 2000, when President Clinton arrived in Colombia for meetings with President Pastrana, 5,000 protesters greeted him shouting, “Yankee go home” and “Imperialism out of Colombia” (Simons, 2004, p. 235). The United States could not achieve its goals, if perceived as either an occupier or usurper of government authority. As shown by looking at the case studies of the Philippines, and Colombia, the U.S. military can do much more with very little in terms of force structure. “A few hundred Green Berets in Colombia and the Philippines can be adequate force multipliers. Ten thousand troops, as in Afghanistan, can tread water” (Kaplan, 2004). Each of these cases cited by Kaplan includes support from Civil Affairs teams. In fact, many cite the Philippine operation as a possible template for future operations (Barnes, 2009). Both the Philippines and Colombia cases highlight by, with, and through or the indirect over the direct approach.

The United States Special Operations Command’s Contingency Plan 7500 outlines the framework for the direct and indirect approach. Admiral Olson speaking of this stated:

The direct approach is urgent, necessary, chaotic and kinetic, and the effects are mostly short term. However, they are not decisive. Enduring results come from the indirect approaches—those in which we enable partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities (Olson, 2009).

This effort is long term, “this approach not only builds partner nation capacity and regional stability, but it also deters the tacit and active support of sanctuaries that foster and develop future terrorists” (Olson, 2009).

In Colombia, as in the Philippines, this indirect approach was used by Civil Affairs teams in the form of construction projects and medical interventions at the local level, not for reconstruction but for desired effects. A Civil Affairs NCO spoke to this regarding operations in Colombia by stating:

The MEDCAPs (Medical and Civic Assistance Program missions) are the best way to access the parts of Colombia that are usually not reached by the government or military. By bringing a non-threatening group that helps the people into the area helps establish a Colombian military footprint (Barker, 2009).

Recently, the Center for Strategic & International Studies produced an in depth report on Columbia and lessons learned from the United States operations there. It stated that while the problems involved were specific to Colombia many of the factors are shared by other countries facing similar circumstances. Therefore, this model has wider applicability (Feickert, 2005, p. 60). According to the report, the root cause of Colombia's problems was the state's inability to exercise authority in large areas of the country (Feickert, 2005, p. 61). In other words the Colombian government did not have the consent of the governed, the fourth key element of legitimacy. Support it was deemed should be timely (preventive) and sustainable (long-term). Further, the small footprint equated to large gains and proved an asset. This small footprint negated both international and domestic criticisms of the operations taking place and allowed them to proceed (Feickert, 2005, p. 69). In regards to training, it was also important not to produce a clone of the U.S. military but one built around its own strengths, attempting to counteract its inherent weaknesses (Feickert, 2005, p. 70). Once referred to as Preventative Defense, these operations will gain importance again, due the improving capabilities of the U.S. Army, and the constraints of the projected environment (Shelton, 1997). The U.S. military can prepare for these challenges by ensuring all Civil Affairs forces maintain regional alignment and proper operational placement of these forces, which will allow the greatest utility.

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